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It is increasingly common for firms to break up their production process across
different regions and countries. While the existing literature credits improvements
in communication technology with enabling fragmentation, there is practically no
empirical evidence on the determinants of firms’ sourcing strategies. In this disser-
tation, I document the roles of communication technology, distance to suppliers, and
labor cost differences in a firm’s decisions about i) whether to fragment production
across distinct geographic locations; ii) whether to offshore fragmented production;
and iii) how much to offshore. To do so, I construct an original dataset about U.S.
plants’ and firms’ fragmentation choices. The data yield a rich set of new facts about
firms’ sourcing decisions which I incorporate into a theoretical model. I then use
the new data to test the model’s predicted equilibrium relationships and to assess
the relative importance of communication technology, distance, and labor costs in
firms’ sourcing strategies.
I construct the fragmentation dataset using new information about U.S. man-
ufacturing plants’ decision to contract for manufacturing services from domestic or
foreign suppliers in 2007. Chapter two describes these data and presents ten new
stylized facts about plants’ and firms’ sourcing decisions. Most notably, the data
show that fragmentation: (i) is 13 times more prevalent from domestic than foreign
suppliers; (ii) is done mostly by larger and more productive plants; and (iii) varies
substantially within industries. The new facts are also consistent with the premise
that firms fragment to access cheaper labor but that they pay a fixed cost to do so.
In the third chapter, I incorporate these new facts into a model of heteroge-
neous firms that decide where to locate the various stages of their production process.
Firms fragment production to access cheaper labor, but breaking up production is
costly. Firms incur a fixed cost to establish a supply network and additional per-
task costs to coordinate production and transport inputs. The fixed costs deliver
standard productivity sorting predictions, while the marginal costs add a new di-
mension of heterogeneity in firms’ organization of production. In particular, firms
with access to better communication technology, or in locations closer to their po-
tential suppliers, will find fragmentation relatively more profitable. The model also
shows that firms in high wage locations have more to gain from fragmentation, while
firms in low wage states must offshore to access cheaper wages.
The fourth chapter provides an empirical assessment of the model’s predicted
equilibrium relationships. I estimate the relative importance of labor cost savings,
technology, and distance to suppliers in a plant’s decision to fragment production.
The estimates indicate that plant use of electronic networks (as a proxy for com-
munication technology) is associated with an 18 percentage point increase in the
probability of fragmentation, and a ten point increase in the probability of locating
fragmented production offshore. While wage differences and distance to suppliers
also have statistically significant relationships with plants’ sourcing strategies, com-
munication technology accounts for five times more of the explained variation than
wages and distance combined. In contrast, for the decision about how much to off-
shore, wage differences are relatively more important than distance, and technology
explains almost none of the observed variation. Because plant technology may be
endogenous, I estimate the differential impact of plants’ use of electronic networks
on fragmentation in industries whose production process can be codified electroni-
cally more easily. As expected, plant use of electronic networks has a bigger impact
on fragmentation in industries that are better able to specify production processes
electronically. However, plants that use networks in industries with high electronic
codifiability are less likely to locate their fragmented production offshore. Estimates
from firm-country level import data suggest that successful electronic communica-
tion depends upon suitable technology in the sourcing location. The results sup-
port the premise that technology facilitates production fragmentation, but uncover
substantial heterogeneity in technology’s effectiveness across firms, industries, and
sourcing locations.
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There is increasing interest in firms’ decisions to break up or fragment parts
of their production processes. The importance of fragmenting across countries, i.e.,
offshoring, is evidenced by the large share of intermediate inputs in international
trade (Yeats, 2001; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001), and is frequently attributed to
new communication technology.1 However, there is little systematic evidence of the
impact of communication technology on offshoring, or of its importance relative to
traditional trade or labor cost saving motives. In addition, much of the discussion
has centered on offshoring because of its potential to harm domestic employment
and wages, but some of these potential costs would be absent, or at least mitigated,
by domestic rather than foreign fragmentation. We have even less evidence on firms’
decisions to fragment domestically, though it may be an alternative to offshoring
with very different implications for domestic workers.
In this dissertation I assess the role of technology, relative to wage differences
and transportation costs, in a firm’s decision to break up its production across
foreign and domestic locations. Using original micro data from the 2007 U.S. Census
1For example, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) state “Revolutionary advances in trans-
portation and communications technology have weakened the link between labor specialization
and geographic concentration, making it easier to separate tasks in time and space” (p. 1978);
Rodŕıguez-Clare (2010) says, “Falling costs of coordination and communication have allowed firms
in rich countries to fragment their production process and offshore an increasing share of the value
chain to low-wage countries” (abstract); and Baldwin and Venables (2010) attribute fragmentation
of production to “ ...revolutionary advances in information and communications technology that
massively lowered the cost of organising complex activities over distances” (p. 1).
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of Manufactures (CM), I uncover novel facts about the fragmentation of inputs
that are customized to meet a firm’s specific production criteria. This type of
customized fragmentation requires communicating specifications across locations,
so that the data are uniquely suited to assess the role of communication technology
in fragmentation. I develop a theoretical framework that incorporates the new
facts and delivers predictions about the trade-off that firms face between labor cost
savings and fragmentation costs. Additional tests support the theory and suggest
that communication technology is the most important factor in a firm’s decision
about whether or not to fragment or offshore, while wage differences matter most
in determining the extent to which it does so.
The second chapter presents a set of stylized facts from a new dataset about
U.S. plants’ production fragmentation decisions. The new data are from the CM
and identify whether a plant purchased contract manufacturing services (CMS) from
other plants (within its company or from another company) to process its inputs; and
if so, whether the plant primarily purchased these services domestically or abroad.
I combine these data with additional information from the CM, the Longitudinal
Business Database (LBD), and firm-level imports, to document a number of new
facts about plants that fragment their customized production process. First, a sub-
stantial share of plants do not fragment production across locations. In addition,
despite the secular increase in imported inputs mentioned above, the majority of
plants that fragment primarily source from domestic suppliers. The share of plants
that fragments production domestically is 13 times higher than the share of plants
that offshores, and domestic fragmenters employ almost nine times more workers.
2
The data also show that plants that fragment production to any location are larger
and more productive, particularly so if they offshore.2 These aggregate patterns
also hold within industries and reveal substantial heterogeneity in firms’ sourcing
strategies that are not explained by sectoral differences in production requirements.
Finally, I find considerable differences in the geographical distribution of fragment-
ing plants. Most importantly, 22 percent of plants in low wage states fragment
domestically, compared to 30 percent in high wage states.
In the third chapter, I incorporate the stylized facts into a model of hetero-
geneous firms that can fragment production across domestic and foreign locations.
The model extends Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) to incorporate domestic
fragmentation and non-participation within industries, two key findings in the data.
More specifically, firms make their final good from a set of production tasks, and
these tasks can be performed in foreign or domestic locations in which labor costs
are lower. However, breaking up production is hard to do because firms must incur a
fixed cost to establish a supply network and per-task costs to communicate product
specifications and transport output.3 The model assumes that per-task fragmen-
tation costs are decreasing in firms’ communication technology and proximity to
suppliers. As a result, firms that with access to better technology and those closer
2The finding of a productivity premia for offshorers is consistent with Kurz (2006), who analyzes
U.S. plant-level data on foreign purchases of materials by manufacturers in 1987 and 1992; and
Tomiura (2007), who creates productivity rankings for Japanese firms’ sourcing choices. This
paper extends those findings by showing they hold for fragmentation of customized inputs.
3In Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008), communication technology affects how heterogeneous agents sort into international pro-
duction teams. In those papers, the focus is on the interaction of skill and technology differences,
and all offshoring takes place within the boundary of the firm. I do not model skill differences and
offshoring can take place within or outside the firm.
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to potential suppliers are more likely to fragment. In addition, firms in high wage
states have the largest number of lower cost sourcing options, while firms in low
wage states must offshore to access cheaper labor. Firms also differ in the efficiency
of their final good production, so that the fixed costs of fragmentation lead to stan-
dard productivity sorting predictions. While the productivity sorting is similar to
Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), heterogeneity
in firms’ per-task fragmentation costs and potential for labor cost savings is entirely
new.
In the fourth chapter, I test the equilibrium predictions of the model. Guided
by the theory, I estimate the relative importance of labor cost savings, communica-
tion technology, and transportation costs in plants’ decisions to fragment production
and offshore. The estimates suggest that plant use of electronic networks to coordi-
nate shipments (as a measure of communication technology) increases the probabil-
ity of fragmentation by 18 percentage points, comparable to the effect of doubling
the home wage. Conditional on fragmenting, the probability that a plant will off-
shore is ten percentage points higher for plants that use electronic networks. This
effect is similar in magnitude to the 12 point decrease in the probability of offshoring
fragmented production associated with a doubling of the plant’s home wage. The
negative relationship between a fragmenting plant’s home wage and the probability
it will offshore is consistent with the theoretical prediction that plants fragment-
ing production in lower wage states search for cheaper labor offshore. Plants that
are farther away from foreign entry ports are also less likely to fragment offshore,
supporting the premise that transportation costs affect plants’ sourcing strategies.
4
Using the linked census-import data, I also examine the intensive margin of
offshoring. As expected, I find that conditional on positive offshoring, the extent of
offshored production is decreasing in the relative foreign wage and firms’ distance
to ports. This extends Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005), who find that U.S.
multinationals offshore more from low wage countries, and when transport costs are
low. The analysis here adds a measure of communication technology and includes
fragmentation that is outside the boundary of the firm. More importantly, this pa-
per compares key determinants’ impact on the extent of offshoring to their impact
on whether or not to offshore in the first place. While the estimated coefficients sug-
gest that communication technology, wages, and distance are all important factors
in a firm’s decision to fragment and offshore, the observed variation in producers’
electronic network usage accounts for five times more of the explained variation than
wages and distance combined. In contrast, for firms’ decision about how much to off-
shore, wage differences are relatively more important than distance, and technology
explains almost none of the observed variation.
A plant’s use of communication technology may depend upon the fragmen-
tation strategy it plans to adopt.4 To address this issue, I assume that electronic
networks lower fragmentation costs at least in part by facilitating communication
about production requirements. If this mechanism is at work, the effect of com-
munication technology on fragmentation will depend upon a firm’s ability to codify
its product specifications in an electronic format. Computer Aided Design (CAD)
4See Bustos (2011) for a model in which firm technology is an endogenous choice that affects
the firm’s export decision.
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and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM) software enables plants to codify spec-
ifications in an electronic format that can be sent to suppliers, but the extent to
which plants can use CAD/CAM depends upon their industry’s production process
characteristics.5 I find that plants using networks in the most CAD/CAM inten-
sive industries are over 20 percentage points more likely to fragment production
than plants using networks in the least CAD/CAM intensive industries. Exploiting
differences in communication and information technology across industries is sim-
ilar to Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and Reenen (2011), who estimate the differential
effect of communication technology and CAD/CAM on firms’ hierarchy structure.
While those authors argue that CAD/CAM empowers local managers, thereby de-
centralizing decision-making, I show that it increases communication technology’s
effectiveness in transmitting information and thus facilitates production fragmenta-
tion.6
Although plants that use electronic networks in CAD/CAM intensive indus-
tries are more likely to fragment, the results also show that they are less likely
to locate their fragmented production offshore. A potential explanation is that
the effectiveness of plants’ communication technology also depends upon suppli-
ers’ ability to receive and process electronic communications. Consistent with this
hypothesis, estimates from firm-country level import data show that firm communi-
5Conversations with contract manufacturing suppliers at the Mid-Atlantic Design-2 Part Show
in April 2011 suggest that communication technology makes fragmentation easier when it can by
used in conjunction with CAD/CAM software.
6The complementarity I find between electronic communication and CAD/CAM may explain
why Bloom et al. (2011) do not obtain statistically significant estimates on their measure of elec-
tronic communication for the effect of communication technology on decentralization within a
firm.
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cation technology and industry CAD intensity are associated with an increase in the
probability of sourcing from more technologically advanced countries. This analysis
extends Yeaple (2003), who finds that FDI in skill intensive industries is more likely
to occur in skill abundant countries.7 The results support the premise that technol-
ogy facilitates production fragmentation, but uncover substantial heterogeneity in
its effectiveness across firms, industries, and sourcing locations.
A significant contribution of this dissertation is to document an empirical rela-
tionship between communication technology and firms’ fragmentation and offshoring
decisions. To my knowledge, this is the first systematic evidence on a relationship
that is assumed in much of the existing theory, and which has the potential to
affect a number of the theory’s policy implications. The results suggest that im-
provements in communication technology matter more than wage differentials and
distance to suppliers in U.S. producers’ decisions about whether to fragment and
offshore. In contrast, labor cost savings are the most significant factor in firms’
decision about how much to offshore. The analysis also shows that the impact of
communication technology varies significantly across industries and countries. In-
corporating this variation into existing theory may lead to nuanced, but also richer
and more informative, predictions about offshoring. While I do not calculate the
welfare implications of fragmentation and offshoring, the dissertation does provide
a framework to help inform policy makers. In particular, I show both theoretically
7The results also relate to Head, Jing, and Ries (2011), who show that Chinese cities tend to
import from multiple countries, but that cities vary in their propensity to source from a given
country. The authors posit that the nationality of foreign affiliates may drive a city’s orientation
towards a given country. This paper suggests an alternative explanation. Firms differ in their
technological capabilities, and this variation may drive their compatibility with different sourcing
locations.
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and empirically that domestic and offshore fragmentation are potential substitutes
and that a firm’s decision depends upon the relative costs of each option. As a
result, factors that increase the costs of domestic fragmentation without affecting
offshoring costs may lead to more offshoring.8 Finally, the dissertation highlights
the importance of geographic heterogeneity in producers’ fragmentation costs and
benefits and shows how this variation is related to firms’ organization of production.
In the next chapter, I describe the new data and explain why fragmentation is
a difficult but important activity to measure. The chapter also presents new stylized
facts about plants and firms that fragment their production and describes the main
phenomena the model should capture. I develop a heterogeneous firms model in
Chapter 3 in which firms choose whether to produce in a single location, fragment
domestically, or offshore. In Chapter 4, I assess the model’s predicted equilibrium
relationships along both the extensive and intensive margins. The chapter concludes
with an assessment of the relative importance of labor cost savings, distance to
suppliers, and communication technology for each fragmentation margin.
8The recent case in which Boeing faced charges for opening a new plant in South Carolina is
an example of additional potential domestic fragmentation costs.
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Chapter 2
New Facts about Fragmentation
2.1 Introduction
A major obstacle to conducting empirical work on the determinants of firms’
sourcing strategies has been the lack of data about production fragmentation. Ex-
isting work on fragmentation has generally relied on aggregate input-output tables
to impute the amount and importance of trade in intermediate inputs. While these
data provide useful information about aggregate trends, they may mask significant
firm-level heterogeneity. In this chapter, I describe new plant level data about both
domestic and foreign fragmentation. These data yield ten new facts about firms’
fragmentation strategies.
2.2 Plant level fragmentation data
The fragmentation data are based on a new question in the 2007 Census of
Manufactures (CM). The question asks: “Did this establishment purchase contract
manufacturing services from other companies or other establishments of your com-
pany to process materials or components that this establishment owns or controls?”
Establishments that answer yes are also asked whether they primarily purchase these
9
services domestically or abroad.1 I cannot provide any actual examples of firms or
contract manufacturing service (CMS) purchases in the Census data because the
data are confidential and respondents’ identities cannot be revealed. However, hy-
pothetical examples of CMS purchases include the manufacturing of company A’s
MP-3 player components as instructed by company A; the assembly of company B’s
computer processing chips in B’s overseas plants using specified inputs and a precise
design criterion; and the production of company C’s shoes in non-affiliated facto-
ries using soles provided and materials specified by company C. In each case, the
purchaser furnishes production specifications to the manufacturing service provider.
The CMS question was designed to identify manufacturing establishments that
do not perform all of the physical transformation activities required to complete
their final good. When an establishment pays another firm to perform some of its
manufacturing activities, that establishment is both fragmenting and “outsourcing”
production. If multiple plants within the same firm perform different stages of pro-
duction, that firm is not outsourcing, but it is fragmenting production. According
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), accurate measures of economic
activity require identifying fragmentation both within and outside the firm, because
“When producers subcontract portions of the production process to separate af-
filiated or unaffiliated units, the production function changes at the establishment
level” (OMB (2009), p. 766).2 Fragmentation is also important because it is a
1An establishment denotes a single physical location where business transactions take place and
for which payroll and employment records are kept. It is synonymous with a plant. The question
as it appeared on the Census form is presented in Data Appendix B.
2The OMB (2011) notes that fragmentation and the resulting changes in the production func-
tion affect industry and sector classifications which in turn have an impact on measures such
as the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Producer Price Index, productivity indices, employment, and
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necessary step for firms that relocate part of their production process overseas, or
“offshore.” Offshoring takes place within and outside the boundaries of the firm and
has received ample attention in the literature. There are numerous ways in which
offshoring has been measured, but to my knowledge, none are comparable to the
CMS data analyzed here.
The CMS data provide new information about fragmentation since they differ
from existing measures along several dimensions. First, the data include a com-
prehensive domestic fragmentation measure. Much of the existing literature on
fragmentation focuses only on offshoring, but ignoring domestic fragmentation may
confound factors that affect breaking apart the production process with factors that
affect locating a portion of production overseas. Second, the data are collected at the
plant level and reveal substantial intra-industry heterogeneity in plants’ and firms’
fragmentation decisions. Third, the data contain both outsourced and vertically in-
tegrated production, unlike measures of foreign direct investment that consist only
of the latter. The inclusion of both types of fragmentation is important since, as
noted in Feenstra (1998), “looking within multinational firms alone does not give a
full perspective on what is happening” (p. 36).3 Fourth, the data do not rely on
imported intermediates as a measure of foreign fragmentation. Identifying interme-
diate trade often relies on input-output tables that are relatively coarse and therefore
unlikely to identify intermediate inputs exclusively or entirely.4 Imports of interme-
wages; and the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ industry accounts, national income accounts, and
regional accounts. Houseman, Kurz, Lengermann, and Mandel (2011) also discuss how ignoring
fragmentation may lead to systematic productivity mismeasurement in the U.S economy.
3A limitation of the data is that they do not distinguish between fragmentation that takes place
within or outside the firm so that it is not possible to assess theory about optimal firm boundaries.
4Two new approaches for identifying intermediate trade are proposed by Sitchinava (2008) and
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diates are also a limited measure since they exclude final goods that are assembled
overseas and then re-imported into the home country. Finally, imported inputs can
include raw commodities and standardized “off-the-shelf” inputs. Commodity trade
is generally not considered offshoring, and it is unclear whether intermediate goods
sold in the marketplace represent production fragmentation. While the degree of
specificity needed to classify input trade as fragmentation is ambiguous, the data I
use clearly identify trade in inputs (of goods and services, such as assembly) that are
specialized for the purchaser, and therefore warrant classification as fragmentation.
The CMS data only capture fragmentation of production that is customized
to meet buyers’ specifications, and in that sense may represent a subset of overall
production fragmentation. Since this type of fragmentation requires communicating
product specifications and coordinating input production so that all components fit
together, it is especially relevant for assessing the effect of technology on coordina-
tion and communication costs across separate production locations. Understanding
customized fragmentation is also valuable since it is a relatively new phenomenon;5
disruptions in the supply of customized inputs are extremely costly;6 and recent
trends in U.S. manufacturing suggest that customized production will form an in-
creasingly significant part of economic activity.7
Wright (2011).
5Trade in standardized inputs, and especially commodities, has been common for hundreds of
years. For example, see chapters six and seven in Findlay and O’Rourke (2007).
6The recent earthquake in Japan provides a stark example.
7According to of Forrester Research, “We’re entering a new era in which mass customization
will lead a number of consumer product categories...” Gowdner (2011).
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2.2.1 Description of the CMS sample
The CM is conducted in years that end in 2 and 7. It covers the universe of
manufacturing establishments in the U.S, though not every establishment is asked
the CMS question. While all large plants and all plants that belong to multi-unit
firms were asked the CMS question, only a random sample of small and medium-
sized plants was asked the question. Data for the smallest manufacturing plants,
generally those with less than five employees, are based only on administrative
records and therefore do not include any information about those plants’ CMS pur-
chases.8 Since the administrative records are often based on imputed data, have
no information about CMS purchases, and account for only 1.5% of sales and three
percent of employment in the manufacturing sector, I exclude them from the entire
analysis. All establishments that receive a census form in the mail are legally re-
quired to return the completed form. Despite the legal requirement, a fraction of
establishments did not respond to the CMS question.
I assess the observable characteristics of plants outside the CMS sample to
address potential issues from sample selection. While the CMS sample covers 54
percent of manufacturing establishments (excluding the administrative records), it
includes 75 percent of sales and 71 percent of employment. Appendix B provides in-
formation on the plants outside the CMS sample. To correct for differences between
the sample and the population of potential respondents, I estimate the probability
8The CM uses both short and long form questionnaires, and only the long forms ask the CMS
purchase questions. While all large and multi-unit firm establishments receive the long form,
only a random sample of small, single-unit firms receive the long form. Data for the smallest
establishments is imputed from Federal tax returns and industry averages.
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that an observation is in the CMS sample. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005),
I use the inverse probability as a weight in the empirical analyses.9 Details of the
missing data and weights estimation are in Data Appendix B.
2.2.2 Aggregating to the firm level
To assess firm-level sourcing decisions, I aggregate the plant data to the firm
level. The census data have a variable, firmid, that identifies the firm to which a
given establishment belongs. This variable is superior to the employer identification
number (EIN) used in other datasets to identify ownership. Since a single firm can
use multiple EINs to file its tax returns, EINs may only identify part of a large firm.
I classify firms with at least one offshoring plant and no domestic fragmenters as
“Offshore Purchases.” Firms with at least one domestic fragmenting plant and no
offshoring plants are classified as “Domestic Purchases.” Firms with at least one
plant that purchases domestic CMS and at least one plant that purchases foreign
CMS are classified as “Domestic and Offshore Purchases.” Finally, firms that have
no plants that purchase CMS, and have at least one plant that reported no purchases
of CMS are designated as “No Purchases.” Note that, due to the question design,
an establishment can only source primarily domestically or primarily offshore, while
multi-unit firms can potentially do both.
9Cameron and Trivedi recommend using weights (“that are inversely proportional to the prob-
ability of inclusion in the sample”) for a descriptive or data summary approach. They note that
if a regression model is correctly specified then sample weighted and unweighted estimates should
have the same probability limit, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pp. 817-21.
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2.2.3 Additional plant-level variables
I supplement the production fragmentation data with plants’ total value of
sales, number of employees and industry from the CM. I match the census data to
the LBD to obtain the firms’ employment in all other sectors; and to the Business
Register to identify plants’ latitude and longitude.10 By linking the firm-level data
to the U.S. Customs import transactions data, I also identify the value, country, and
product of firms’ imports.11 I restrict the import data to imports of manufactured
products since imports of inputs that correspond to fragmented production should
be classified in manufacturing.
I construct a value-added labor productivity measure for plant i as vapi =
vai/tei, where va denotes value-added and te denotes total employment. Plant
sales, employment, and productivity all vary significantly across industries. To
make meaningful comparisons of these variables across plants in different industries,
I calculate a relative measure xi,g/x̄g, where x̄g is the mean of variable x in the
six digit NAICS industry g. I use the relative productivity measures to construct
firm-level productivity. In Section 2.3, I also use these relative measures to compare
plant characteristics across CMS purchase types.
10The LBD is a longitudinal panel of every private, non-farm establishment with at least one
employee in the U.S. See Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for details on the LBD.
11It is not possible to link the trade transactions data to individual establishments for multi-unit
firms. See Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) for a detailed description of the import data.
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2.3 New empirical facts
The census data provide new information about which plants and firms frag-
ment their production. The data also highlight within industry patterns about
producers’ sourcing decisions. The linked firm-import data show the relationship
between importing and offshoring and provide evidence on the foreign locations from
which firms purchase CMS. This section presents the new information summarized
in ten stylized facts.
2.3.1 Plant and firm-level participation shares
Table 2.1 presents plant participation shares by CMS purchase status. The
first column shows that 27 percent of plants fragment primarily domestically, while
only two percent fragment primarily offshore. The majority of plants do not pur-
chase CMS, and of those that do, only a small fraction primarily offshore.12 Columns
2 and 3 provide the shares of sales and employment respectively by plants’ CMS pur-
chase status, weighted by the inverse probability of being in the CMS sample. The
percentages of sales and employment at plants that offshore doubles to four percent,
while the percent of sales and employment at plants that fragment domestically
jumps to 39 percent and 35 percent respectively. These findings are summarized as
12Low participation shares are consistent with Hillberry and Hummels (2008), who examine the
1997 Commodity Flow Survey data and find that most U.S. manufacturing plants do not ship goods
across large distances. Limited offshore sourcing for customized production is in line with results
in Tomiura (2007), who finds that only 2.68 percent of Japanese manufacturing firms outsource
production offshore. There is almost no existing evidence on plants’ domestic fragmentation, but
Fally (2011) uses aggregate input-output tables to calculate the average number of sequential
stages of domestic production, weighted by each stage’s value-added. He finds the average number
of manufacturing stages is less than two. See Appendix A, Section A.1 for a discussion about the
potential of substituting CMS purchases with standardized inputs.
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the following facts:
Fact 1: The majority of plants do not fragment their production process for
customized inputs, even on a sales or employment-weighted basis.
Fact 2: Domestic fragmentation is far more prevalent than offshoring.
Although most plants are single-unit firms, approximately 40 percent of the
plants in the CMS sample belong to multi-unit firms. Table 2.2 illustrates important
differences between the plant and firm-level shares. While a majority of sales and
employment take place at plants that do not purchase CMS, columns 2 and 3 show
that firms that do not purchase CMS account for only 31 percent of sales and 42
percent of manufacturing employment. The differences between the plant and firm
level results are largely driven by the high sales and employment shares of firms
with some plants that source domestically and others that source offshore. These
firms account for only one percent of manufacturing firms, but cover 24 percent of
sales and 16 percent of manufacturing employment.13
Table 2.2 provides additional support for Fact 2. Domestic fragmentation is
more prevalent than offshoring at both the plant and firm level. Firms with plants
that purchase CMS primarily domestically account for 55 percent of manufacturing
employment, while firms with at least some offshoring plants account for 19 percent.
In contrast, employment and sales participation shares differ between the plant
and firm-level measures. Activity-weighted firm participation shares suggest that
production fragmentation is a significant phenomenon in economic activity. While
not all plants within a firm fragment production, fragmenting firms account for
13Data Appendix B decomposes this table into firms with and without wholesale establishments.
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a significant share of both domestic and employment and sales. This finding is
summarized by:
Fact 3: The majority of U.S. manufacturing sales and employment takes place
at firms with at least one plant that purchases CMS.
2.3.2 Plant characteristics by CMS purchase status
Table 2.3 presents weighted means for plant sales, employment and the log of
value-added labor productivity by CMS purchase status. Columns 1 and 2 show
that the average plant that fragments production is larger in terms of both sales
and employment than the average non-fragmenting plant. In addition, plants that
fragment production offshore are larger than domestic fragmenters. The average
sales at manufacturing plants with no CMS purchases is approximately $19 million,
while the average sales at offshoring plants is over $50 million. Column 3 shows
a similar pattern for productivity. Domestic purchasers are more productive than
plants with no fragmentation, while offshorers are the most productive. Columns
4-6 present averages by CMS purchase status for relative industry measures. As de-
scribed in Section 2.2.3, the relative measures capture within industry heterogeneity
and ensure that patterns across categories are not driven by industry compositional
differences. The same patterns hold for the within-industry measures. Plants with
no purchases are smaller and less productive than plants that purchase CMS do-
mestically; and offshoring plants are the largest and most productive plants. These
results lead to two more stylized facts:
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Fact 4: Plants that fragment production are larger and more productive than
non-fragmenters.
Fact 5: Plants that fragment production offshore are larger and more productive
than domestic fragmenters.
2.3.3 Industry distribution of CMS purchases
To explore variation in fragmentation within industries, Table 2.4 presents the
industry distribution of the share of plants that purchase CMS domestically and
offshore. I calculate participation shares within each of the 86 four digit North
American Classification System (NAICS) manufacturing industries. The first col-
umn shows that there are two industries in which no plants offshore production. In
one of these non-offshoring industries, 10-20 percent of the plants purchase CMS
domestically, while in the other industry 20-35 percent of plants do. The first strik-
ing observation from Table 2.4 is that all industries have a positive share of plants
that purchase domestic CMS. At least five percent of the plants in every industry
fragment domestically. Table 2.4 also shows substantial non-participation in every
industry. The highest observed share of fragmenting plants is almost 60 percent.
These findings are summarized by:
Fact 6: There is substantial within industry heterogeneity in plants’ sourcing
strategies.
Examining the diagonal of Table 2.4, it is evident that every industry has a
higher share of domestic fragmenters than offshoring plants. This finding provides
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additional support for Fact 2. Domestic sourcing is more prevalent than offshoring
within all NAICS 4 industries.
2.3.4 Geographic distribution of CMS purchases
Plant participation shares also vary across U.S. states. I calculate the average
production worker wage per state and classify states as low wage, medium wage,
and high wage depending upon the tercile to which their wage corresponds.14 Table
2.5 presents the average share of plants within each wage category by CMS pur-
chase status. While two percent of plants offshore in all wage categories, domestic
fragmentation varies substantially. Only 22 percent of plants purchase CMS do-
mestically in low wage states, while 30 percent fragment domestically in high wage
states. This finding leads to an additional stylized fact:
Fact 7: Domestic fragmentation is more prevalent in high wage states.
2.3.5 Firm import patterns
The CMS data capture the subset of fragmentation in which inputs are cus-
tomized to meet buyers’ specifications. To compare this customized offshoring to
measures based on imports, Table 2.6 shows data on manufacturing firms’ imports
of manufactured goods, by firms’ CMS purchase status. Column 1 indicates that
firms with one or more plants that purchase CMS account for 67 percent of imports.
Domestic fragmenters import 36 percent of imports, while offshoring firms import
31 percent. Columns 2 and 3 show that average imports by domestic fragmenters
14See Data Appendix B for details on the wage measure.
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are $7.2 million, compared to $18.7 million for offshorers and $429 million for firms
with a mix of plants that fragment domestically and abroad. While it is impossible
to measure the exact extent to which imports correspond to CMS purchases, off-
shoring firms’ high share of imports and large average imports suggest that offshore
CMS purchases constitute an important trade activity.
Table 2.6 also presents the average extent to which firms offshore, measured as
firms’ imports over sales. 15 Column 4 shows that domestic fragmenters rely little on
imported inputs. Their average imports over sales is only three percent, compared
to 20 percent for firms that primarily offshore. Somewhat surprisingly, firms with no
CMS purchases import an average of nine percent of their sales. To assess whether
this high share may result from industry compositional differences or sales in other
sectors, I calculate firms’ share of imports over sales relative to the average share of
their modal industry. Excluding firms with employment outside of manufacturing,
the relative shares are 0.67, 0.68 and 3.9 for non-purchasers, domestic fragmenters,
and offshorers respectively. Offshoring firms’ share of imports over sales is almost
four times their industry average, while non-purchasers and domestic fragmenters’
share is less than their industry mean. This leads to an additional fact:
Fact 8: Firms that source customized inputs primarily offshore have a dispro-
portionately high ratio of imports to sales.
Much of the existing literature has focused on imported intermediate inputs
as a measure of offshoring. Column 4 in Table 2.6 presents the average share of each
15Since a significant portion of manufacturing firms that import have wholesale establishments,
I include firms’ sales in manufacturing and wholesale in the denominator. Firms may have sales in
other sectors, but these data are not readily available. Data Appendix B provides a decomposition
between firms with and without wholesale trade establishments.
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firm’s intermediate inputs over total imports.16 On average, 65 percent of offshoring
firms’ imports consist of intermediate inputs. This share is slightly higher than the
share of intermediates in total imports at domestic fragmenters (62 percent) and
non-fragmenters (60 percent). The data suggest that while the majority of CMS
imports comprise intermediate inputs, fragmentation may also entail trade in final
goods.
Although the CMS data lack specific details about the products and locations
from which firms fragment, the trade data provide information about the products
and countries of firms’ imports. Column 1 in Table 2.7 shows that about 40 percent
of firms that do not purchase CMS import manufactured goods. Imports by firms
that do not purchase CMS may reflect purchases of standardized materials, inputs,
or final goods that are sold in the marketplace; or they may reflect imports that
relate to activities in other sectors in which the firm is active. About half of all firms
that purchase domestic CMS import goods, while 90 percent of offshoring firms
import. Firms that purchase CMS offshore but do not import may be offshoring
the final assembly of goods that they sell overseas.17 Nearly all firms that purchase
CMS both domestically and offshore import manufactured goods. Table 2.6 also
shows firms’ share of imports from low-income countries. I classify countries as low
income if they are in the bottom two per-capita GDP terciles.18 Column 2 shows
16A firm’s intermediate inputs are determined based on the HS commodity codes identified as
inputs in the BEA I-O tables for the firm’s four digit NAICS code or codes.
17Almost all of these firms export goods. It is also possible that some firms are erroneously
classified as non-importers due to an inability to link the import data to the census data. This
should not be a big issue, however, as I match 92 percent of the transactions and 91 percent of the
value of imports.
18I obtain countries’ per-capita GDP in 2007 from the International Monetary Fund. The GDP
data are unavailable for a small number of countries that represent less than one percent of imports
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that firms with no CMS purchases and domestic CMS purchases import 28 and 19
percent of their manufactured good imports from low-income countries respectively.
In contrast, offshorers source almost half of their imports from low-income countries.
This leads to the following fact:
Fact 9: Offshoring firms import relatively more from low-income countries
than domestic fragmenters and non-fragmenters.
Table 2.7 also provides information about the products and countries from
which firms import. Column 2 shows that the median count of distinct ten digit
Harmonized System (HS) codes imported by firms is zero for firms with no CMS
purchases and one for domestic fragmenters. In contrast, firms that purchase CMS
offshore import a median of eight distinct products, and firms with both domestic
and offshore purchasing plants import a median of 123 products. Column 3 shows
that this pattern holds for the subset of importing firms in each category. Columns
4 and 5 provide the same statistics for the number of countries from which a firm
imports. Firms with no CMS purchases import from a median of zero countries,
domestic fragmenters import from a median of one, and offshorers import from a
median of three. Firms with a mix of plants that source domestically and offshore
import from a median count of 20 countries. Conditional on importing, firms that
source primarily offshore still import from more countries than firms that fragment
domestically or not all.
The firm-level import patterns in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide a reassuring val-
idation of the CMS data. The vast majority of firms that purchase CMS primarily
in each CMS category.
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offshore import manufactured goods. In addition, these firms import a wider range
of products from a greater number of countries compared to firms that purchase
CMS primarily domestically or not at all. Table 2.7 also shows that firms that
purchase CMS offshore tend to source from multiple countries. These findings are
summarized by a final stylized fact:
Fact 10: Offshoring firms are more likely to source multiple goods and from
multiple countries than domestic fragmenters and non-fragmenters.
2.4 Manufacturing and wholesale firms
In the previous section, I provide summary statistics for all manufacturing
firms. Since the evidence suggests that some of these firms have extensive activities
in other sectors, I now break down the import summary statistics for manufacturers
into the set of firms with and without wholesale establishments. This distinction is
important because the U.S. wholesale sector has evolved to include establishments
that design, market, and sell their own goods. Because these establishments per-
form little or no physical transformation activities, they are classified as wholesalers.
From an economic theory perspective, however, the firms are essentially manufac-
turers that have offshored all of their physical transformation activities. Unfortu-
nately, data limitations for wholesalers make it impossible to assess the portion of
manufacturing-wholesale firms’ activities that have been fully offshored. To ensure
that these firms do not introduce a systematic bias in the subsequent empirical
analysis, it is therefore important to compare manufacturing firms with wholesale
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establishments to those without wholesale plants. If these firms’ observable charac-
teristics are markedly different, then a cleaner analysis in Chapter 4 should use only
the former.
2.4.1 CMS data for wholesale establishments
The CMS question was asked not only of plants in the manufacturing sector,
but also of establishments in wholesale trade. For wholesale trade, every establish-
ment in 49 of the 71 NAICS industries was asked the CMS question. The firm level
statistics I report are based on both the wholesale and manufacturing plants’ CMS
purchase status with a firm.19
2.4.2 Firm-level CMS participation shares
Table 2.8 provides firm level participation shares by CMS purchase status. The
top panel covers all firms with at least one manufacturing establishment. This panel
is identical to Table 2.2 but is included here for easy comparison. The bottom panel
of Table 2.8 decomposes the firm level numbers between manufacturing firms with
no wholesale establishments and manufacturing firms with wholesale establishments.
Shares at firms without wholesale plants are quite similar to the plant level shares,
while firms with both manufacturing and wholesale establishments have relatively
higher sales and employment figures. Participation shares for firms that source
both domestically and offshore exhibit the largest difference between firms with and
19Table B.2 in Appendix B provides a list of the excluded wholesale industries. Calculating
the manufacturing firms’ summary statistics based solely on a firm’s manufacturing plants’ CMS
status yields almost identical results.
25
without wholesale plants. While firms that source domestically and offshore account
for only two percent of sales for the former group, they account for 31 percent of
sales for the latter.
2.4.3 Firm-level imports
Table 2.9 shows the share of manufacturing firms’ imports of manufactured
goods, by firms’ CMS purchase status. The top panel is identical to the first three
columns of Table 2.6. The bottom panel of Table 2.9 decomposes the aggregate firm
statistics between manufacturing firms with and without wholesale establishments.
For manufacturing only firms, fragmenting firms account for 44 percent of manu-
factured good imports by the sample, still a non-trivial amount. Average import
patterns are similar to the aggregate numbers; offshoring firms have a higher average
quantity of imports and a higher average share of imports over sales.
Table 2.10 provides information about the share of firms that import, the prod-
ucts they import and the countries from which they import, by firm CMS purchase
status. The top panel is comparable to Table 2.7. The bottom panel decomposes
manufacturing firms into those with and without wholesale establishments. For
firms with no wholesale establishments, Column 1 shows that almost 40 percent of
firms that do not purchase CMS import manufactured goods. About half of all firms
that purchase CMS primarily domestically import goods, while almost 90 percent of
offshoring firms import. Nearly all firms that purchase CMS both domestically and
offshore import manufactured goods. Manufacturing firms with wholesale establish-
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ments are much more globally integrated. 88 percent of these firms import goods,
and those that purchase CMS domestically and offshore import a median count of
177 products from a median of 25 countries.
These tables suggest that there are important differences between manufactur-
ing firms with and without wholesale establishments. In particular, a combination
of domestic and offshore sourcing is far more prevalent among firms with whole-
sale establishments. In addition, firms with wholesale establishments import more
goods and from a wider range of countries. Given the existing data constraints for
the wholesale sector, the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 is based on the subset
of manufacturing firms without wholesale plants. This focus ensures that plants’
and firms’ manufacturing activities are correctly measured and do not exclude the
portion of the firms’ manufacturing activities that have been completely relocated
offshore. Understanding the role of wholesale establishments in firms’ offshoring
decisions, however, remains a potentially fruitful avenue for future work.
2.5 Conclusion
The new CMS data provide key insights into plant and firm level fragmen-
tation strategies. A substantial share of plants and firms do not break apart their
production of customized inputs, and the vast majority of those that do primarily
source domestically. Plants that fragment production are larger and more produc-
tive than non-fragmenters, and plants that source offshore are the largest and most
productive. These patterns persist within industries, indicating substantial within
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industry heterogeneity in firms’ sourcing strategies. In addition, high wage states
have the largest share of plants that fragment production domestically. Finally, off-
shoring firms have a higher ratio of imports to sales, a higher share of imports from
low income countries, and import a greater range of products from more countries.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Plant participation shares by contract manufacturing service purchase
status
Plants Sales Emp
No Purchases 0.71 0.57 0.61
Domestic Purchases 0.27 0.39 0.35
Offshore Purchases 0.02 0.04 0.04
Notes: Approximately 106,500 manufacturing plants
in the CMS sample. Sales and employment shares
weighted by the inverse probability of inclusion in the
CMS sample.
Table 2.2: Manufacturing firm participation shares by contract manufacturing ser-
vice purchase status
Firms Sales Emp
No Purchases 0.69 0.31 0.42
Domestic Purchases 0.28 0.42 0.39
Offshore Purchases 0.02 0.03 0.03
Domestic & Offshore 0.01 0.24 0.16
Notes: Manufacturing firms are all firms in the CMS
sample with one or more plants classified in manufac-
turing. Sales and employment shares weighted by the
inverse probability of inclusion in the CMS sample.
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Table 2.3: Plant means by contract manufacturing service purchase status
Raw Means Relative Industry Means
Salesa Emp ln(VAP) Sales Emp ln(VAP)
No Purchases 19,487 51.3 4.51 0.87 0.91 -0.03
Domestic Purchases 37,077 79.8 4.63 1.28 1.20 0.07
Offshore Purchases 51,457 137 4.74 2.17 1.69 0.20
All Plants 24,686 60.4 4.55 1.00 1.00 0.00
Notes: Weighted by the inverse probability of inclusion in the CMS sample. a Sales
in $000s.
Table 2.4: Industry distribution of the share of establishments that purchase con-
tract manufacturing services
86 Manufacturing Industries (NAICS 4)
Offshore Purchases
Domestic Purchases (% of estabs in industry)
(% of estabs in industry) 0% 0-5% 5-10% 10-20% Total
5-10% 0 2 0 0 2
10-20% 1 22 2 0 25
20-35% 1 31 6 2 40
35-50% 0 13 4 1 18
50-60% 0 1 0 0 1
Total 2 69 12 3 86
Note: Categories defined such that LHS < %estabs ≤ RHS
30




No Purchases 0.76 0.73 0.68
Domestic Purchases 0.22 0.25 0.30
Offshore Purchases 0.02 0.02 0.02
Table 2.6: Manufacturing firm imports, by contract manufacturing service purchase
status




(share) (millions $s) (mean) (mean)
No Purchases 0.33 2.5 0.09 0.60
Domestic Purchases 0.36 7.2 0.03 0.62
Offshore Purchases 0.07 18.7 0.20 0.65
Domestic & Offshore 0.24 428.5 0.16 0.75
Notes: Manufacturing firms are all firms in the CMS sample with one or more plants
classified in manufacturing. Imports are of manufactured goods only. Measures































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Manufacturing firm participation shares, by contract manufacturing ser-
vice purchase status and firm type
Firms Sales Emp
All Manufacturers
No Purchases 0.69 0.31 0.42
Domestic Purchases 0.28 0.42 0.39
Offshore Purchases 0.02 0.03 0.03
Domestic & Offshore 0.01 0.24 0.16
Manufacturing Firms With
No Wholesale Plants
No Purchases 0.70 0.57 0.61
Domestic Purchases 0.28 0.38 0.35
Offshore Purchases 0.02 0.04 0.03
Domestic & Offshore 0.00 0.02 0.01
Wholesale Plants
No Purchases 0.52 0.23 0.18
Domestic Purchases 0.37 0.43 0.45
Offshore Purchases 0.05 0.03 0.03
Domestic & Offshore 0.07 0.31 0.34
Notes: Manufacturing firms are all firms in the CMS
sample with one or more plants classified in manufac-
turing. Sales and employment shares weighted by the
inverse probability of inclusion in the CMS sample.
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Table 2.9: Manufacturing firm imports, by contract manufacturing service purchase
status and firm type
Total imports Average imports Imports
Sales
(share) (millions $s) (mean)
All Manufactures
No Purchases 0.33 2.5 0.09
Domestic Purchases 0.36 7.2 0.03
Offshore Purchases 0.07 18.7 0.20
Domestic & Offshore 0.24 428.5 0.16
Manufacturing Firms With
No Wholesale Establishments
No Purchases 0.56 0.7 0.09
Domestic Purchases 0.31 1.0 0.03
Offshore Purchases 0.09 4.4 0.19
Domestic & Offshore 0.03 41.4 0.15
Wholesale Establishments
No Purchases 0.29 64.5 0.12
Domestic Purchases 0.37 123.6 0.13
Offshore Purchases 0.06 153.4 0.30
Domestic & Offshore 0.28 542.0 0.16
Notes: Manufacturing firms are all firms in the CMS sample with one or
more plants classified in manufacturing. Imports are of manufactured goods















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model of Production Fragmentation
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a static partial equilibrium model of firms’ produc-
tion fragmentation decisions. It is a model of heterogeneous firms with an exogenous
wage similar to Helpman et al. (2004) and Antràs and Helpman (2004), but incorpo-
rates the concept of task production with costly fragmentation originally introduced
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). The model incorporates the stylized facts
presented in Section 2.3 and provides a framework to assess the costs and benefits
associated with fragmenting production across different locations.
3.2 Demand










where Qj is an index of aggregate consumption in industry j, and λj is an exogenous
share of income spent on industry j. Aggregate consumption in industry j is a
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where ε = 1
1−σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods in a given
industry. For now I drop the j subscripts with the understanding that all industry
variables refer to industry j.
These CES preferences lead to demand for a particular variety i in a given
industry,





where p(i) is the price of variety i and E is aggregate expenditure.
3.3 Production
There is an exogenous mass of producers, Njh, in each industry and geographic
home state h. In the model, producers’ location is exogenous to their sourcing
arrangement. In the empirical section, I consider the possibility that producers
choose their location based on their anticipated sourcing strategy and use several
approaches to address the potential biases that could result.
Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied inelastically. Producers
use one unit of labor to produce one unit of task output. Production in each indus-
try requires a continuum of tasks, normalized to one and indexed by k. Producers
combine task output via a Leontief production function to produce a single com-
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posite input M . More formally, M = mink{mk}, k ∈ [0, 1], where mk denotes the
output of task k.1
Producers have heterogeneous productivity denoted by ϕ > 0. They transform
the composite input M into their product via: q = ϕM . As a result, the production
of one unit of q requires q/ϕ units of M . Productivity can therefore represent
production efficiency (same quality at lower cost) or product quality (higher quality
at equal cost). The key assumption here is that productivity heterogeneity affects
the transformation of the input M into output q, but does not alter firms’ ability
to convert labor into task output.2
3.4 Profits within an integrated plant
Consider an integrated plant, defined as one that performs all of its own pro-
duction tasks within a single plant. With CES preferences, the optimal final goods’
price is a mark-up over marginal cost and is given by pi(ϕ) = Ci/ϕσ, where Ci
denotes the marginal cost of the input M for firm i. Let wh denote the wage in the
producer’s home state. Because producers make mk one to one from labor, the cost









1The assumption of single composite input with a Leontief production function is based on the
set-up in Rodŕıguez-Clare (2010). The assumption of no substitutability between tasks that use
the same factor of production is common in the literature and simplifies the analysis. The model
could be extended so that the composite input is produced via a constant elasticity of substitution
technology that depends on the intensity with which each task is performed.
2This assumption is similar to Antràs and Helpman (2004) where a firm’s productivity does not
affect the productivity of its input suppliers. See Appendix Section A.2.3 for additional discussion.
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As is standard in this class of models, the most productive producers are also the
biggest and most profitable producers.
3.5 Production with fragmentation across locations
When fragmentation is possible, final good producers can purchase task out-
put from manufacturing service providers (MSPs) in different locations.3 MSPs
specialize in the production of a single task that they customize for multiple final
good producers. By specializing, the MSP is more efficient at the production of a
given task than an integrated plant.
3.5.1 Benefits from fragmentation
The MSP efficiency gain is captured by its use of α < 1 units of labor to
produce one unit of mk.
4 MSPs are located in a domestic state, D, or offshore, O.
There is free entry and perfect competition among MSPs so that the price of a task
purchased from an MSP in sourcing location s is simply equal to its local production
cost:
Ps(mk) = αws, where s ∈ {D,O}. (3.3)
By purchasing tasks from an MSP, a final good producer benefits from the gain in
specialization, α, and can access potentially cheaper labor in the MSP’s location.
3MSP is the term used by practitioners and by the U.S. Census Bureau to describe these
specialized suppliers.
4The model could be extended to allow α to vary across sourcing locations. Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2009) argue that countries may differ in their productivities for given activities
due to external economies of scale. Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2009) find that differences in labor
market institutions across countries affect within firm labor productivity.
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3.5.2 Costs of fragmentation
Although purchasing tasks from MSPs allows a final good producer to enjoy
efficiency gains and perhaps access to cheaper labor, it also entails certain costs.
Establishing a supply network incurs a fixed cost fD when the MSP is domestic and
fO when the MSP is foreign, with fD ≤ fO. These costs are paid in the final good
producer’s home wage.
Fragmentation also incurs a task specific cost due to the additional transporta-
tion and coordination needs associated with breaking up the production function
across locations. The fragmentation cost for firm i in industry j to source task k
from location s is represented by the function:
τ(δis, ωk, ηi, ηs, ρj) ≥ 1 (3.4)
which I assume is continuously differentiable in all its arguments. δis denotes the
distance between the final good producer and the sourcing location s. Transporta-
tion costs are increasing in distance so that ∂τ
∂δ
> 0. ωk represents an inherent
characteristic, such as weight, of the output from task k. ∂τ
∂ω
> 0 reflects task-
specific differences in fragmentation costs attributable to these inherent differences.
ηi captures producer i’s information technology, while ηs reflects the state of tech-
nology in the sourcing location. I assume technology lowers fragmentation costs so
that ∂τ
∂η
< 0. ρj represents the extent to which production technology in industry
j is amenable to electronic communication. In the empirical section, I assume that





< 0. In addition, firms with better technology enjoy greater fragmen-




Final good producers pay the task specific fragmentation costs in units of
labor from sourcing location s.5 The per-unit cost to final good producer i for task
k purchased from an MSP in location s is then:
ckis = αwsτ(δis, ωk, ηi, ηs, ρj). (3.5)
3.6 Profits with fragmentation
Final good producers can perform all tasks within a single integrated plant,
I, or can source an endogenous share of tasks from an MSP in another domestic
state, D, or offshore location, O. To determine which sourcing strategy maximizes
total profits, producers first maximize variable profits for each strategy. They then
compare total profits across strategies by subtracting the respective fixed costs as-
sociated with fragmentation to a given location.
Fragmenting only maximizes variable profits if it results in lower costs of task
production. Order tasks such that fragmentation costs are strictly increasing in the
5Payment of fragmentation costs in units of foreign labor is based on the offshoring cost set-up
in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
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index k.6 A necessary, though not sufficient, condition for fragmentation is then
wh > αwDτD(0) or (3.6a)
wh > αwOτO(0), (3.6b)
where D and O denote the lowest cost domestic and offshore locations respectively,
and τ(0) denotes the fragmentation cost of task k = 0. Equation (3.6) simply states
that the task with the lowest fragmentation cost must be cheaper to fragment, either
domestically or offshore, than to produce in an integrated plant. Whenever Equation








In this case, the decision to offshore is independent of the home wage and depends
only the relative costs and benefits of sourcing from the lowest cost domestic loca-
tion relative to the lowest cost foreign location. I assume that the distance to an
offshore location is greater than the distance to a domestic location, and/or that
domestic technology is superior to foreign technology so that τD(k) < τO(k) ∀k.
From Equation (3.7), this assumption means that wO < wD for offshoring to occur.




. As domestic fragmentation costs increase in the
6For this ordering to hold across locations, the task-specific component of fragmentation costs,
ωk, can interact with distance or technology, but not both. Under this assumption, the ordering is
without loss of generality and the ordering of tasks’ fragmentation costs, though not their absolute
size, is the same across locations. See the appendix for further discussion. Assuming costs are
strictly increasing in k is not without loss of generality. The appendix in Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) addresses the possibility of flat portions in the offshoring cost function in a model
of homogeneous firms and perfect competition.
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task index, k, offshoring costs increase at least as much.
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) highlight the role of relative wages and costs in de-
termining whether fragmentation and offshoring take place. If the wage differential
is not sufficiently high relative to fragmentation costs, then producers will not frag-
ment and non-participation arises without any role for fixed costs and productivity.
The other potential corner solution is wh > αwsτs(1), where s ∈ {D,O}. In this
case, producers fully fragment. Since the focus of this paper is on U.S. manufac-
turers that still perform some fraction of their physical transformation activities, I
assume wh is sufficiently low so that full fragmentation does not occur.
If a producer only fragments to one location s, then its optimal share of frag-
mented tasks, k̄s, is implicitly defined by
wh = αwsτs(k̄s), where s ∈ {D,O}. (3.8)
With sourcing from one location, the cost of the composite input M , for producer i
sourcing from s is now:
Cis = (1− k̄s)wh + αws
k̄s∫
0
τis(k) dk, where s ∈ {D,O}. (3.9)
If a producer sources domestically and offshore, then its share of offshored








while k̄D is given by Equation (3.8). In this case, the producer’s home wage has
no effect on its share of offshored tasks. When a producer sources domestically and
offshore, the cost of the composite input M is then
Ci = (1− k̄D)wh + αwO
k̄O∫
0




where k̄O is the share of tasks offshored and k̄O− k̄D is the share of tasks fragmented
domestically.












whfs, where s ∈ {D,O,DO}. (3.12)
3.7 Equilibrium sourcing strategy
In equilibrium, final good producer i chooses the sourcing location s that max-
imizes profits maxs{πis}, where s ∈ {I,D,O,DO}. Since fragmentation entails a
fixed cost, it will never occur if Equation (3.6) does not hold. In this section, I
determine the optimal fragmentation strategy for the subsets of producers in a geo-
graphic state for whom: (i) domestic fragmentation maximizes variable profits; (ii)
offshoring maximizes variable profits; and (iii) a mixed strategy of domestic and
offshore fragmentation maximizes variable profits. I first determine producers’ opti-
mal share of fragmented tasks, and then identify those producers’ profit maximizing
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decision.
Producers who face costs ckiD < ckiO ∀k represent the subset of producers for
whom domestic fragmentation maximizes variable profits, ND. Figure 3.1a illus-
trates this cost scenario. In the figure, CD, the cost of the composite M defined in
Equation (3.9), is simply the area under the bold line. Because domestic fragmen-
tation also entails a fixed cost, Figure 3.1b depicts the optimal sourcing strategy
for firms with these wage and cost conditions. Fragmentation lowers marginal costs
and therefore results in a profit function that is steeper in ϕ, but the fixed cost to














find it optimal to fragment domestically.
Empirical prediction 1: All else equal, a firm will fragment domestically if
doing so maximizes its variable profits and the firm’s productivity is sufficiently
high (i.e., ϕi > ϕ̃iD).
When ckiD < ckiO ∀k for some firms, ignoring the domestic fragmentation
option will overpredict the amount of offshoring, while underpredicting total frag-
mentation. Figure 3.1a shows that if offshoring were the only option, the share of
fragmented tasks would be lower (k̄O < k̄D), as would the production cost savings.
The subset of producers for whom offshore fragmentation maximizes variable
profits, NO, face costs ckiD > ckiO ∀k. Figure 3.2a depicts this situation. CO,
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the cost of the composite input M , is the area under the bold line. The cost of
M under offshoring is clearly lower than the cost with domestic fragmentation,
which is the lower than the cost from integrated production. If the relative fixed
costs are small compared to the relative costs of M under domestic versus offshore
fragmentation, then optimal profits are similar to those in Figure 3.1b, except here
only integrated production or offshoring take place. However, if relative fixed costs











then integrated production, domestic fragmentation, and offshoring are all possible
profit maximizing strategies. Figure 3.2b depicts this case. Producers in the subset
NO, with productivity between ϕ̃D and ϕ̃O, fragment domestically, while those with













Empirical prediction 2: All else equal, a firm will offshore production if doing
so maximizes its variable profits and the firm’s productivity is sufficiently high (i.e.,
ϕi > ϕ̃iO).
In this case, ignoring the domestic fragmentation margin would again overpre-
dict the amount of offshoring and underpredict the overall amount of fragmentation.
Let ϕ̂O denote the offshoring threshold in a world with no domestic fragmentation.
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Figure 3.2b shows that ϕ̃D < ϕ̂O < ϕ̃O. As a result, producer i with productivity
ϕ̃D < ϕi < ϕ̂O would no longer fragment if domestic fragmentation were not an op-
tion, while producer l with productivity ϕ̂O > ϕl < ϕ̃O would now offshore instead
of fragmenting domestically.
A third potential scenario may lead to domestic and offshore fragmentation
by the same producer. If the difference between the domestic versus offshore cost
is not the same for each task (i.e., ∂τD(.)/∂k < ∂τO(.)/∂k), then a single producer
may find both offshoring and domestic fragmentation optimal. Figure 3.3a depicts
this case. The lowest cost for the composite input is attained by offshoring k̄O,
and fragmenting k̄D − k̄O domestically. The bold line is the graphical equivalent
of Equation (3.11), where the area underneath the line represents the cost of M
under a mix of domestic and offshore fragmentation. If fixed costs are high relative
to fragmentation cost savings, then integrated production, domestic fragmentation,
offshoring, and a mix of domestic and foreign sourcing are the four possible profit
maximizing strategies. Figure 3.3b depicts these profit functions. Here, producers














In this scenario, ignoring the domestic fragmentation option would still overpre-
dict the extent of offshoring and underpredict total fragmentation. Let k̂O denote
the share of offshored tasks when domestic fragmentation is not an option, where
wh = αwOτO(k̂O) implicitly defines k̂O. Figure 3.3a shows that for each producer
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that would have fragmented both domestically and offshore, k̂O < k̄D (recall from
Equation (3.11) that k̄D represents total fragmented production). In addition, there
is no longer a domestic fragmentation profit function, so the new productivity thresh-
old is once again ϕ̃D < ϕ̂O < ϕ̃O. More producers offshore, but fewer fragment.
3.8 The likelihood of fragmentation
The model provides a framework in which to assess how changes in producer
technology, distance to suppliers, and labor cost differences affect the decision to
fragment production. This section assesses how these factors affect: (i) whether or
not fragmentation is potentially feasible (i.e., the impact on variable profits), and
(ii) total profits.
3.8.1 Variation in producer’s technology
The model predicts that plants with better communication technology, η, will
face lower fragmentation costs. In particular, the cost of the composite input M for














dk < 0. (3.16)
The term in square brackets in Equation (3.16) is equal to zero from Equation
(3.8).7 The second term represents the inframarginal savings that result from better
7This is essentially the envelope condition in that the impact of changes in the share of tasks
fragmented on profits is zero to the first order. As is true for all derivatives, this expression holds
for small changes in η. Figure 3.1a shows that the derivative may not capture the effect of large
changes in η on task production costs.
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technology. Holding distance and wage differences constant, an improvement in
communication technology decreases fragmentation costs. This decrease means that
fragmentation is now potentially viable for a larger set of firms.
Producers for whom fragmentation already maximized variable profits are also
more likely to fragment production in response to improvements in their commu-








Plugging in Equation, (3.16), better technology increases fragmentation profits.
Since πI is unaffected by the change, this implies a lowering of the productivity
threshold above which fragmentation is optimal. An individual firms is now more
likely to exceed that threshold, so that:
Empirical prediction 3: All else equal, plants with better communication tech-
nology will be more likely to fragment production.
3.8.2 Variation in the home wage
For fragmentation to occur, the home wage must be sufficiently high so that
some tasks are cheaper to purchase from another location. In particular, Equation
(3.6) is more likely to hold when wh is large. As a result, the measure of producers
for which fragmentation has the potential to maximize total profits is increasing in
the home wage.
An increase in the home wage may also make fragmentation relatively more
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profitable for the subset of producers for whom fragmentation already maximizes
variable profits. Consider the effect of a change in the producer’s home wage, wh.






(1− k̄s)[Cs]−ε + fs/(ε− 1)B
. (3.18)
where
B ≡ (1− σ)A
(σϕ)1−ε
.
For a producer that is indifferent between integrated and fragmented production be-
fore the wage change, the relative decrease in integrated profits exceeds the decrease













This condition reflects the fact that fixed costs from fragmentation are paid
in the home wage. If fixed costs are greater than this threshold, an increase in the
home wage results in additional fixed costs that swamp the marginal cost benefits
from fragmentation. This result leads to the following prediction:
Empirical prediction 4: All else equal and assuming fixed costs are not too
large, the profitability of fragmentation is increasing in producers’ home wage.
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3.9 Domestic versus offshore sourcing
Of the firms that fragment production, only those with productivity above
ϕ̃ε−1O do so offshore. Since the slope of the offshoring profit function depends upon
fragmentation costs, the likelihood of exceeding ϕ̃ε−1O is also decreasing in the dis-





















The three terms inside the parentheses are positive, so the effect on the offshoring
threshold depends upon the sign of the terms in the square brackets. If a decrease
in distance to foreign suppliers does not affect plants’ distance to domestic suppli-
ers, then the second term is zero and Equation (3.19) is positive. The offshoring
threshold is therefore higher, leading to the following prediction:
Empirical prediction 5: All else equal, plants that are closer to potential off-
shore sourcing locations will be more likely to offshore.
The offshoring threshold also depends upon communication technology. Specif-





















The terms in parentheses are positive, so the offshoring threshold is decreasing in




. Plugging in Equation (3.16) shows that an im-
provement in communication technology will make offshoring relatively more prof-
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itable than domestic fragmentation if the inframarginal cost savings from offshored
production exceed the inframarginal cost savings of domestic fragmentation. Con-
sider the case depicted in Figure 3.2 where ciD > ciO. In this case, offshoring
maximizes variable profits, but the higher fixed cost to offshore induces domestic
fragmentation over some range of ϕ. Under these conditions, the terms in the first

















The first term is always negative, while the second two terms offset each other if the
technology shock affects all tasks and domestic and offshore costs equally. When this
occurs, a technology improvement will lower a firm’s offshoring threshold, making
it more likely that the firm offshores. In contrast, if the technology shock lowers
domestic fragmentation costs relatively more than offshoring costs, the offshoring
threshold may rise, thereby decreasing the likelihood that a given firm will exceed
the threshold.
Empirical prediction 6: All else equal, communication technology affects the
likelihood of offshoring, but its impact depends upon technology’s effect on domestic
versus offshore costs.
Finally, the home wage affects the likelihood that a fragmenting producer
sources offshore. To see why, suppose there is one high wage domestic state, one
low wage state and one offshore location, where wO < wL < wH . For simplicity,
assume that τO(.) = τL(.) = τH(.) so that αwOτO(.) < αwLτL(.) < αwHτH(.).
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With this set-up, all producers in the high wage state face the scenario depicted
in Figure 3.2a. Offshoring maximizes variable profits, but only those producers
with productivity above ϕ̃O will source offshore, while those with ϕ̃D < ϕ < ϕ̃O will
fragment domestically. In contrast, no producers in the low wage state will fragment
domestically, while those with ϕ > ϕ̃O will offshore.
8 This leads to a final prediction
about fragmenting producers’ decision to offshore:
Empirical prediction 7: All else equal, the likelihood a fragmenting plant will
offshore is decreasing in its home wage.
3.10 Share of fragmentation
In equilibrium, the share of tasks a final good producer fragments depends
on the relative wage differences across locations. If a producer only sources from
one location, then Equation (3.8) shows that the share fragmented by producers for







It is important to note, however, that for a producer sourcing from multiple loca-
tions, Equation (3.10) shows that the share of tasks offshored is independent of the
home wage and depends only the wage differences between sourcing alternatives.
This leads to the following prediction:
8If the gain from specialization is sufficiently high (i.e., α is sufficiently below 1), firms in low
wage states may still fragment in their own state.
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Empirical prediction 8: The share of tasks purchased from location s is de-
creasing in the location’s wage relative to alternate sourcing location wages.
A decrease in fragmentation costs will also result in an increased share of
fragmentation (i.e., dk̄
dδ
> 0 and dk̄
dη
> 0).9 This yields the additional prediction:
Empirical prediction 9: The share of tasks producer i fragments will be in-
creasing in the producer’s communication technology and decreasing in its distance
to suppliers.
3.11 Conclusion
The model makes predictions about the extensive and intensive margins of
producers’ equilibrium fragmentation strategies. More productive producers with
better information technology and located in higher wage states are more likely to
fragment production. Of these fragmenting producers, the most productive and
those that are relatively closer to foreign sourcing locations are more likely to off-
shore. In contrast, fragmenting producers’ propensity to offshore is decreasing in
their home wage, since producers in low wage states are less likely to find other
domestic locations that provide lower labor costs. Finally, the degree to which pro-
ducers fragment their production process depends upon the relative wages in their
sourcing sites and the fragmentation costs they incur.





































































































































































































































Testing the Model’s Predictions
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I use the new fragmentation dataset to test the equilibrium
relationships predicted by the model. First I focus on the extensive margins and esti-
mate determinants of the probability that a plant purchases contract manufacturing
services (CMS), as well as the probability that a fragmenting plant will offshore. I
then use the linked import data to assess the relationship between firm character-
istics and the extent of offshore production. Although the theoretical framework in
Chapter 3 shows that a firm’s decisions about whether and how much to fragment
and offshore are made simultaneously, I estimate each margin separately. This esti-
mation strategy is driven by the relevance of each margin, the theory’s implications
about how margins are likely to be related to each other, and by practical data
limitations. I explain these factors in each section. Finally, I disaggregate the firm
import data by country to determine whether the effects of firm characteristics on
sourcing strategies depend upon location specific factors.
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4.2 The fragmentation decision
In this section, I estimate the probability that a plant will fragment production.
To my knowledge, this specification provides the first evidence on the determinants
of a producer’s decision to break up its production process across distinct geographic
locations. Since the theory suggests that domestic and foreign fragmentation may
be substitutes for some firms, grouping both types of fragmentation together avoids
violating the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption that would arise
from multinomial logit estimation.1 I evaluate the importance of technology, dis-
tance and labor cost savings in a plant’s decision to fragment its production process
by estimating:





where yi,j,h equals one if plant i in industry j and home state h purchases CMS. Techi
is a plant level measure of communication technology. wageh is the producer’s home
state wage, Disti is a set of distance measures from plant i to domestic suppliers,
ports and borders, and Prodi denotes plant productivity terciles. I include a full
set of six digit NAICS industry dummies, βJ , as controls.
I measure plants’ local labor costs with state-industry level U.S. wages con-
structed from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupation Employment Statistics.
To minimize any potential bias arising from the relationship between wages and
1I have also estimated the probability of no fragmentation, domestic fragmentation, and off-
shoring jointly in a multinomial logit specification. While the the estimated coefficients change,
their economic interpretation is qualitatively similar.
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skill, the wage measure is based solely on production worker occupations and the
mix of these occupations for a given industry is fixed across states. As a result,
the variation in wages across states is attributable to differences in states’ wages for
detailed occupations.2 Averaged over industry, the mean state wage is $14.58, with
a standard deviation of $1.08. The lowest wages are $12.44 and $12.96 in South
Dakota and Mississippi respectively, while the highest wage is $17.97 in Alaska, fol-
lowed by Delaware, Washington, Michigan and Connecticut, all with average wages
above $16.
To capture distance to potential domestic suppliers, I calculate the distance
between each plant and the closest manufacturing service provider (MSP). I iden-
tify a potential supplier as the closest manufacturing establishment that specifies its
primary activity as “Providing contract manufacturing services to others.”3 I con-
struct three additional measures to capture the distance between an individual plant
and foreign sourcing locations. First, I calculate the distance between each plant
and the closest deep water port. I also calculate the distances between each plant
and the closest border crossing with Mexico and the closest crossing with Canada.4
Table 4.1 presents the average distance, by CMS purchase status, between a plant
and the closest MSP, deep water port, and border crossings. The average minimum
distance to an MSP is only two miles for the entire sample, though the average dis-
tance for non-fragmenting plants is 2.2 miles compared to 1.6 miles for fragmenters.
2Additional information on the wage data is presented in Data Appendix B.
3The 2007 CM asked all plants in the CMS sample to identify their primary activity from
four choices. “Providing contract manufacturing services to others” is one of the four options.
Additional details of the variable construction, as well as the exact question from the Census, are
provided in Data Appendix B.
4Details for the port and border crossing locations are in Data Appendix B.
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On average, plants that purchase CMS primarily offshore are 50 miles closer to a
deep water port than plants that purchase CMS domestically. Offshoring plants are
also 78 miles closer to Mexican border crossings relative to domestic fragmenters.
In contrast, domestic fragmenters are over 50 miles closer to border crossings with
Canada.
I construct productivity terciles using the log of plants’ value-added labor
productivity. I use terciles to follow the model’s prediction that producers must ex-
ceed a productivity threshold for profits from fragmentation to exceed profits from
integrated production. One implication of the model is that a plant for which frag-
mentation is optimal will be larger if it fragments.5 As a result, plants’ measured
productivity may be subject to reverse causality. Plants that fragment production
are larger, as a result of fragmentation, and therefore have higher measured pro-
ductivity. To address this issue, I instrument for plant productivity in 2007 using
lagged values from 2002. I discuss the IV strategy in more detail below.
I measure a plant’s use of communication technology with an indicator vari-
able equal to one if the plant used electronic networks to control or coordinate its
shipments in 2007. Specifically, the indicator identifies plants that negotiate the
price or terms of sale for their shipments over an Internet, Extranet, Electronic
Data Interchange (EDI) network, electronic mail, or other online system. Although
this measure directly relates to shipments rather than input purchases, it is a useful
proxy for plants’ general use of communication technology. Using data collected
5Recall that for fragmentation to be optimal, the marginal cost of fragmented production must
be less than the marginal cost of integrated production. With price set to a constant mark-up
over marginal cost and downward sloping demand, a plant with the same underlying productivity
parameter will therefore be larger if it fragments.
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in the 1999 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) Computer Survey Network Use
Supplement (CNUS), the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) 2001 E-Stats report
finds that just over half of the manufacturing plants that used networks to coor-
dinate shipments in 1999 also used networks to make input purchases. Additional
calculations from the CNUS show that 32 percent of plants that sold goods over net-
works also used networks to provide information about their design specifications
to external suppliers, compared to only 16 percent of plants that did not sell goods
over networks.6
An obvious problem with estimating Equation (4.1) is that a plant’s commu-
nication technology may be endogenous to its sourcing strategy. If a plant installs
a technology platform and adapts its business processes to use electronic networks
because it is planning to fragment production, an unobserved positive shock to
fragmentation may increase electronic network use. If this occurs, the estimated
coefficient on technology will be biased. Since a plant’s use of electronic networks
to control or coordinate its shipments is driven by multiple factors, some of which
are unrelated to fragmentation, one way to address the potential reverse causality
problem is to instrument for plants’ use of networks in 2007 with lagged values of
their use in 2002. Table 4.2 presents the shares of plants that used these networks
by plants’ 2007 CMS purchase status. 36 percent of non-fragmenters, 51 percent of
domestic fragmenters, and 61 percent of offshorers used electronic networks in 2007.
6Plants that do not use networks to control or coordinate shipments may still use the internet.
For example, the DOC (2001) shows that approximately 87 percent of manufacturing plants in
the 1999 ASM sample used an electronic network at their plant. In contrast, only 31 percent and
33 percent of the ASM plants accepted or placed orders online respectively. These data are only
available in 1999. Additional details on electronic network use data are provided in Data Appendix
B.
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In 2002, these shares are lower by a factor of roughly half for each CMS category.
For the lagged instrument to be valid, plants’ use of networks in 2002 must
be determined by factors other than their decision to fragment production in 2007.
For example, the instrument can identify a causal relationship if plants that used
networks in 2002 to facilitate sales decide to fragment in 2007 because their existing
communication technology makes fragmentation relatively more profitable. There
are concrete reasons to believe that factors other than fragmentation play an impor-
tant role in plants’ use of networks to control or coordinate shipments. According to
the DOC (2001), almost half of the plants that used networks to control or coordi-
nate shipments in 1999 did not use networks to purchase inputs. McElheran (2010)
also investigates the relationship between E-buying and E-selling and finds that,
although both processes share the same technology platforms, E-selling generally
entails more complex organizational changes. Finally, Table 4.2 shows that in 2007,
36 percent of plants that did not fragment production used electronic networks.
To identify a causal relationship using lagged values as instruments, it is also
necessary for plants’ fragmentation status in 2007 to differ from their fragmentation
status in 2002. In particular, the instrument’s power to identify a causal relation-
ship depends upon the existence of plants that used networks in 2002 but did not
fragment production. Although the 2002 CM did not ask the 2007 CMS purchase
question, I use two similar questions from 2002 to assess differences between plants’
2002 and 2007 fragmentation strategies. The 2002 CM asked an establishment: 1)
whether it contracted with another firm for any of its production using materials
owned by the respondent; and 2) whether it sent any partially completed products to
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a foreign facility for processing that were then returned to the respondent. Respon-
dents had the option to check YES or NO to both of these questions. I compare the
2007 fragmentation status of single-units to their 2002 contract purchases.7 Table
4.3 decomposes plant shares for each 2007 CMS category according to 2002 elec-
tronic network use and fragmentation status. Columns 3 and 4 in the second row
show that 15 percent of plants that purchase CMS domestically in 2007 used net-
works in 2002, and almost half of these plants did not fragment production in 2002.
The third row shows that 28 percent of plants that offshore in 2007 used networks in
2002, and half of these plants did not fragment in 2002. Table 4.4 presents similar
shares for 2002 electronic network use and offshore CMS purchase status. The third
row shows that 31 percent of offshoring plants in 2007 used networks in 2002, though
less than 20 percent of these plants offshored in 2002. These tabulations suggest
the data contain sufficient variation in fragmentation status across electronic net-
work use for the lagged values to be suitable instruments. To substantiate the use
of lagged instruments further, Section 4.4 includes a robustness check in which the
sample consists only of single unit plants that did not fragment production in 2002.
4.2.1 Main results for fragmentation
Table 4.5 reports results from estimating Equation (4.1). Column 1 provides
OLS estimates from a regression on all plants in the CMS sample, weighted by
the inverse probability of inclusion in the sample.8 The second column reports
7I limit the comparison to single unit firms since the 2002 question asks only about contract
purchases from another firm.
8The weighted and unweighted estimates are almost identical.
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OLS results for the IV sample. Since the instruments are lagged 2002 values, the
IV sample consists of plants that existed in the same physical locations in 2002. I
estimate a linear probability model (LPM) rather than logit or probit because of the
large number of industry fixed effects, and so that the results are more comparable
to the IV estimates; however, Appendix Table B.5 shows that marginal effects from
probit estimation are quite similar.9 Column 3 presents results for the IV estimation.
I focus on these results since they correspond to the preferred specification.
The estimated coefficient on electronic networks suggests that plants using
electronic networks are 18 percentage points more likely to fragment. The coefficient
is larger than the OLS estimate, consistent with the measure of network use to
coordinate shipments being a noisy proxy for plant communication technology that
facilitates communication with input suppliers. The estimated coefficient on the
state wage is positive and significant and suggests that a plant in Washington state
is 4.3 percentage points more likely to fragment than an otherwise identical plant
in Mississippi, where average production worker wages are almost 30 percent lower.
Productivity also has the expected positive relationship. Relative to plants in the
lowest productivity tercile, plants in the second and third terciles are 12 and 16
points more likely to fragment respectively. Hillberry and Hummels (2008) detect
significant non-linearities in the role of distance in shipments between plants, so
I create indicators for different distance categories. Relative to plants that have a
9Because the endogenous technology variable and productivity measures are discrete, the IV
regression cannot be estimated via IV probit. In addition, probit fixed effect estimates are incon-
sistent due to the incidental parameters problem. While it is possible to estimate to estimate a
conditional logit model with fixed effects, estimating partial effects on the response probabilities
with this specification requires plugging in values for the industry indicators (p. 492 Wooldridge
(2002)). This exercise would not be practical in the analysis here.
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manufacturing service provider (MSP) within a five mile radius, plants that are 5-10
miles away from the closest MSP are 2.1 percentage points less likely to fragment
production, while those over 20 miles away are 2.8 points less likely to fragment.
Plants’ distance to a deep water port or a Canadian border crossing has a negligible
relationship with the likelihood of fragmentation. In contrast, plants that are more
than 50 miles from a border crossing with Mexico face a 2.8 percentage point decrease
in the probability of fragmentation, relative to plants that are within 50 miles of the
border.
There are three first stage regressions, two for productivity terciles two and
three, and one for the electronic networks variable. The first three columns in Table
4.6 present the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the instruments in each
first stage regression. The lagged instrument is always significant in its own first
stage regression, with the expected positive coefficient. Each column reports Shea’s
partial R-squared for that column’s endogenous variable. These range from 0.03
to 0.11.10 Each column also reports the F-Statistic for the null hypothesis that the
instruments are jointly equal to zero. These F-statistics are well above the threshold
of 10 proposed in Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002).
4.2.2 Differential impact of communication technology across indus-
tries
In this section, I take an additional step towards identifying the causal ef-
fect of technology on the probability of fragmentation by focusing on a specific
10See Shea (1997) for a discussion of the partial R-squared as an indicator of weak instruments.
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mechanism through which technology lowers fragmentation costs. In the model,
technology lowers fragmentation costs by making it easier to communicate design
criteria and production specifications across locations. In practice, a plant’s use of
electronic networks for these purposes depends upon its ability to codify the design
and production requirements in an electronic format. If this ability varies across
industries, electronic networks will lower fragmentation costs more in those indus-
tries in which the production process is amenable to electronic codification. The
interaction between a plant’s communication technology and its industry electronic
codifiability identifies the marginal benefit of communicating design criteria and
production specifications electronically.11
I measure variation in industry electronic codifiability as the share of plants
in a NAICS 6 industry that used Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer
Aided Manufacturing (CAM) software in 1999.12 This software allows plants to cod-
ify their input design criteria and the requisite physical transformation processes in
an electronic format. Use of CAD/CAM software varies substantially across indus-
tries. The variation is driven by the complexity and extent to which the physical
transformation process can be codified electronically. There is little benefit to cre-
ating a CAD file for a non-complex product whose specifications can be described
11This approach is similar to the identification strategy in Rajan and Zingales (1998) who as-
sess the effect of financial development on country growth by estimating the differential impact
financial development has on growth in industries that are dependent on external financing. Those
authors note “One way to make progress on causality is to focus on the details of theoretical
mechanisms through which financial development affects economic growth, and document their
working” (p.560).
12Conversations with various manufacturing service providers and their customers at the Mid-
Atlantic Design-2-Part Show in Phoenixville, PA on April 14, 2011 suggest that electronic com-
munication facilitates fragmentation most when it can be used in conjunction with CAD/CAM
software. The CAD/CAM data were collected by the U.S. Census Bureau as part of the 1999
CNUS. Additional details are in Appendix B.
67
in a simple text file, while certain production process are simply not amenable to
electronic codification in CAM software.13
Industry CAD intensity ranges from almost zero to one, with a mean of 0.44
and standard deviation of 0.25. The least CAD intensive industries are food man-
ufacturing and textiles, while automotive, aerospace and machinery manufacturing
are all CAD intensive. Table 4.7 presents correlation coefficients of industry CAD
intensity and various industry-level measures. Consistent with the premise that
CAD facilitates communication about design specifications, the share of plants in
an industry that use CAD software is highly correlated with the industry fraction
of plants that report using electronic networks to share their product designs with
suppliers, as well as with the fraction that share designs electronically with other
company units. The correlation coefficients with CAD intensity are 0.49 and 0.54
respectively, with p-values of 0.00. Industry CAD intensity is also positively corre-
lated with industry capital intensity and skill intensity, with correlation coefficients
of 0.09 and 0.16 respectively.14 CAD intensity also seems to be higher in industries
that use more differentiated inputs. The correlation coefficient between industry
CAD intensity and the fraction of inputs not sold on an exchange and not reference
priced, as calculated by Nunn (2007), is 0.26 and significant at the one percent
level. Finally, I investigate whether CAD-intensive industries may have already ex-
perienced significant offshoring of the entire physical transformation process. To do
13For example, spring and wire manufacturing requires a continuous physical transformation
process that cannot be performed by machines run by CAM software.
14Capital intensity is measured as total assets owned by plants in an industry at the beginning
of 2007 relative to the industry’s total employment. Skill intensity is the share of non-production
workers in an industry relative to total employment. All variables are from the 2007 U.S. Census
of Manufactures.
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so, I calculate the ratio of industry imports by wholesale firms relative to domes-
tic production. As described in chapter 2, firms that design goods and coordinate
production processes in foreign locations are classified in the wholesale sector. The
second to last row of Table 4.7 shows that the ratio of industry imports by wholesale
firms with no U.S. manufacturing plants relative to the value of U.S. manufacturers’
production is unrelated to industry CAD intensity. The bottom row shows a similar
result for imports by all wholesale firms, including those with U.S. manufacturing
establishments.
Column 4 in Table 4.5 reports results from estimating Equation (4.1) with
an additional interaction term between plant use of electronic networks and indus-
try CAD intensity. I do not include the CAD variable directly because it is fully
absorbed by the industry fixed effects. The interaction term has a positive and
statistically significant coefficient, supporting the hypothesis that electronic com-
munication lowers fragmentation costs more in industries in which plants are better
able to specify production requirements electronically. To gauge the magnitudes and
implied economic significance of the coefficients, Figure 4.1a plots the full effect of
electronic networks evaluated at different levels of CAD intensity. The figure depicts
a strong increasing relationship. Relative to plants that do not use electronic net-
works, plants that use networks in “other apparel” manufacturing (CAD intensity
of 4 percent) are only 4.5 percentage points more likely to fragment, while plants
using networks in the “semiconductor machinery” manufacturing (CAD intensity of
98 percent) are 32 percentage points more likely to fragment than plants not using
networks. The differential impact of electronic networks between these two indus-
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tries is thus about 27 percentage points. The coefficients on wage and distance are
largely unchanged in this specification.
The right panel in Table 4.6 presents the estimated coefficients and standard
errors for the instruments in each first stage regression. The lagged instrument
is always significant in its own first stage regression, with the expected positive
coefficient. Shea’s partial R-squared measure ranges from 0.03 to 0.14, while F-
statistics for the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to zero are
well above 10.
4.2.3 Additional controls
There are several additional concerns that arise when estimating Equation
(4.1). First, the model assumes that aggregate expenditure is identical across loca-
tions, though in reality this is clearly not the case. Since firm size depends upon
aggregate expenditure, firms in areas with higher demand might be more likely to
overcome the fixed costs of fragmentation. If demand and wages are correlated, then
the estimated wage coefficient will be biased. I assess this potential issue by con-
trolling for personal income in the plant’s economic area, as defined by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA).15 Column 5 in Table 4.5 shows that controlling for
local demand does not affect the estimated coefficients.
Another potential concern is that the estimated effect of wages is biased by
differences in worker skill across states. Although the wage measure is based on
15There are 179 BEA economic areas. These areas are designed to capture relevant regional
markets surrounding metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas.
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wage differences within detailed occupation codes across states, these differences
may still reflect skill heterogeneity. To assess the extent to which the wage estimate
is biased by skill, I construct skill measures that vary by state. Column 6 in Table
4.5 presents estimates of Equation (4.1) controlling for the state’s share of workers
with a college degree and the share of production workers with a high school degree.
The inclusion of these skill measures does decrease the estimated wage coefficient,
but it is still positive and statistically significant.16 The estimate now implies that,
compared to an otherwise identical plant in Mississippi, a plant in Washington state
is 2.4 percentage points more likely to fragment.17
4.3 Domestic versus offshore fragmentation
I now analyze a plant’s decision to locate its fragmented production offshore. I
estimate a variant of Equation (4.1), where the dependent variable is equal to one if
plant i in industry j and home state h purchases CMS primarily offshore. I restrict
the analysis to plants that fragment production so that the estimated coefficients
reflect the impact of covariates on the probability of offshoring, relative to domestic
fragmentation. The estimates for the probability of fragmentation therefore capture
the determinants of breaking up the production process, while results in this section
reflect the costs and benefits of locating fragmented production offshore. Because
16If fragmentation results in the fragmenting plant performing the higher skilled tasks while the
lower skilled tasks are performed elsewhere, then the estimated coefficient on skills will be positive.
17I have also estimated Equation (4.1) controlling for the share of state workers with an asso-
ciate’s degree and a high school degree, and the share of production workers with a college degree
and an associate’s degree. In all cases, the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest are
largely unchanged.
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the analysis is conditional on fragmentation, these estimates do not confound the
effect of covariates on the likelihood of breaking up the production process with
their effect on the likelihood of offshoring. However, to gain a complete picture of
plants’ offshoring decision, the estimates from both the fragmentation and offshoring
regressions must be considered together.18
4.3.1 Main results for offshoring
Table 4.8 reports the results from estimating Equation (4.1) on the subset
of fragmenting plants. As before, columns 1 and 2 provide OLS estimates for the
full and IV samples respectively, while column 3 reports the IV estimates. The
IV estimates suggest that plants using electronic networks to coordinate shipments
are ten percentage points more likely to locate their fragmented production offshore.
Based on the prediction from the model, this suggests that electronic communication
has a differential impact of fragmentation costs that is increasing in distance. The
estimated wage coefficient also has the expected negative sign. The probability
that a fragmenting plant in Mississippi will purchase CMS offshore is 3.5 percentage
points higher than the probability that a fragmenting plant in Washington state
will do so. Consistent with the model, plants in the top productivity tercile are 3.8
percentage points more likely to offshore relative to the least productive plants.
While distance to the nearest MSP was an important factor in plants’ decision
to fragment, it does not seem to play a role in their decision to offshore. The
18An alternative specification would be the nested logit model in which the first branch is a plant’s
decision to fragment or not. For plants that fragment, the second branch would be the decision
to source domestically or offshore. Estimating a nested logit, however, requires alternative-specific
variables which are not available for these data.
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estimated coefficients for being 5-20 miles and over 20 miles from the closest MSP
are both close to zero. In contrast, distance to international entry ports does appear
to affect plants’ decision to offshore production. Plants that are over 200 miles away
from a deep sea port are 2.4 percentage points less likely to fragment, relative to
plants within 50 miles of the closest port. The estimates also show that plants over
50 miles from a border crossing with Mexico are 9.4 percentage points less likely to
source their fragmented production from a foreign country relative to plants that
are within 50 miles of the border. Being close to Canada, however, does not have
a statistically significant relationship with the probability a fragmenting plant will
source offshore.
Table 4.9 presents the estimated coefficients, standard errors and weak instru-
ment tests for all instruments in each first stage regression. The lagged instrument
is always positive and significant and the F-Statistic for the null hypothesis that the
instruments are jointly equal to zero is well-above the threshold of 10 for each first
stage regression.
4.3.2 Differential impact of communication technology across indus-
tries
I also estimate the differential impact of electronic networks across industries
on the probability of offshoring. As in Section 4.2.2, I allow the effect of electronic
networks to vary by industry CAD intensity. Column 4 in Table 4.8 presents the
estimates. In contrast to results for the probability of fragmentation, the inter-
73
action between plant use of electronic networks and CAD industry intensity for
the probability of offshoring is negative. Figure 4.1b depicts the full effect of net-
works, evaluated at different levels of CAD intensity. While electronic network use
is associated with a higher probability of offshoring for all levels of CAD intensity,
networks’ impact appears to decrease with CAD intensity. The full effect is impre-
cisely estimated at low and intermediate levels of CAD, but the negative interaction
is significant for the high CAD industries. A possible explanation for this result
is that the average state of technology in foreign sourcing locations is below the
average U.S. level. Receiving CAD/CAM files and using them correctly requires so-
phisticated equipment and workers. As a result, CAD software’s potential to reduce
coordination and communication costs across locations when used in conjunction
with electronic networks cannot be fully realized if a given location does not have
the ability to use it. Below, I investigate this possibility using the import data
disaggregated by country.
The finding that electronic communication has a differential impact on the
probability of relocating fragmented production offshore adds a new dimension to
our understanding of the determinants of offshoring. Rather than treating technol-
ogy as a single parameter that affects all firms and industries the same way, the
results in Tables 4.5 and 4.8 uncover heterogeneous responses within and across in-
dustries. In addition, technological change does not necessarily make offshoring more
likely. Technological improvements that facilitate domestic fragmentation may ren-
der offshoring less profitable if foreign sourcing locations are not properly equipped
to exploit new infrastructure or techniques.
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4.3.3 Additional controls
As in the fragmentation regressions, I ensure that the results are robust to
controlling for local expenditure and state skill measures. Column 5 in Table 4.8
shows that controlling for the level of personal income in the plant’s economic area
does not affect the estimated coefficients. When I control for skill, the coefficient
on the share of production workers in a state with at least a high school degree
is negative and significant and the wage coefficient decreases slightly. While these
results suggest skill may play a role in plants’ decision to source their fragmented
production offshore, the qualitative relationships predicted by the model are robust
to controlling for observed skill heterogeneity.19
4.4 Robustness checks for probability of fragmenting and offshoring
In the model, producer’s location is exogenous to their sourcing strategy. This
assumption is plausible if firms’ location is based on historic patterns. In the long-
run, however, producers’ location may depend upon their anticipated sourcing strat-
egy. While the IV regressions are based on plants that existed in a given location for
at least five years, this time frame could still include firms that chose their location
with a fragmentation strategy in mind. I therefore repeat the analysis using the
subsample of plants that had already existed in their 2007 location for at least ten
years. Columns 1 and 4 in Table 4.10 show that the estimated IV coefficients in
the fragmentation and offshoring regressions are largely unchanged, relative to the
19This is true for the six variants of state skill measures I constructed.
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estimates in the baseline IV specification.
I also re-estimate Equation (4.1) excluding plants in the automotive industry.
The automotive industry has the highest share of domestically fragmented plants
and is often considered a leader in the new methods for fragmenting production.
Columns 2 and 5 in Table 4.10 show that the automotive industries are not driving
the results. The estimated coefficients retain the same magnitude and statistical
significance.
Finally, I revisit concerns about firms’ use of electronic networks being endoge-
nous to their sourcing strategy. As discussed in Section 4.2, I can identify single unit
firms’ fragmentation status in 2002. To ensure that IV estimates of firms’ use of
networks are not driven by correlation in fragmentation status over I time, I conduct
a robustness check in which I limit the sample to single unit firms that did not frag-
ment in 2002. I then instrument for firms’ use of networks to coordinate shipments
in 2007 with their use of networks to coordinate shipments in 2002. Although the
sample is considerably smaller (the restriction to single unit firms alone cuts the
sample almost in half), the main results are robust. Columns 3 and 6 in Table 4.10
show that plants using electronic networks are more likely to fragment production
and offshore. The estimated coefficients on wages, distance, and productivity are
all qualitatively similar to benchmark results as well.
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4.5 Extent of offshored production
In this section, I turn to the intensive margin of firms’ offshoring decision. To
assess the relationship between producer characteristics and the extent of fragmented
production, I estimate:
ln(sharef ) = βJ + βTTechf + βwwagef,s/US +
∑
βDDistf + βP ln(Prodf ) + εi,j,h,(4.2)
for firm f in industry j. The data do not provide information about the total share
of fragmented production, and the import data are only available at the firm level,
so I use firm imports over sales as a proxy for the extent of production sourced
offshore.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a firm’s imports do not necessarily reflect offshored
or fragmented production. To maintain the focus on firms that fragment customized
production processes, I limit the analysis to the subsamples of manufacturing firms
with positive import values that purchase CMS primarily offshore and primarily
domestically.20 I estimate Equation (4.2) separately for the offshoring and domestic
fragmenters to allow the estimated coefficients to vary by firm sourcing strategy.
Separate estimations for each sample are appropriate since Section 4.3 shows sig-
nificant roles for distance, wages, and communication technology in plants’ decision
to source primarily offshore versus primarily domestically. For the estimates to be
consistent, I rely on the assumption that, conditional on being in the sample, the
20I limit the analysis to manufacturing firms without wholesale establishments so that the em-
pirical analysis tracks the theory more closely. There are not enough manufacturing firms with
both domestic and offshore purchases to disclose those regression results.
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log import to sales ratio follows a classical linear model. This assumption under-
pins a “hurdle” or “two-tiered” model that is often used to address corner solution
outcomes such as those present here. Using this methodology, the probability of
offshoring is estimated in the first step, and the log import share equation is es-
timated in a second, independent step via OLS. The estimates presented in this
section therefore correspond to estimates of the second step in a hurdle model.21
Multi-unit firms may span multiple industries, so I control for industry us-
ing the firm’s share of employment in each four digit NAICS code. I construct an
import-weighted average relative foreign wage for each firm using country-industry-
occupation wages from the International Labor Organization.22 This wage measure
is clearly endogenous to firms’ sourcing choices, so the estimates provide an assess-
ment of the equilibrium relationship in the model between wages, fragmentation
costs and the extent of offshored production, but do not uncover any causal effect.
Although the model does not specify a role for productivity in determining the
share of offshored production, I include the log of value added firm productivity as
a control to ensure that the electronic network use indicator is not biased by its
correlation with productivity. As before, I measure firms’ distance to foreign entry
ports, using the minimum distance over all establishments for multi-unit firms. In
the specification that includes the electronic networks and CAD intensity interac-
21The total impact of an independent variable on the extent of offshored production is then a
combination of its effect on the probability of offshoring and its effect on the import share. I do
not calculate the combined effect here since the extensive margin decision estimates are based on
plant-level data and I am limited to firm-level data for the intensive margin analysis. Wooldridge
(2002) pp. 536-7 describes the hurdle model in detail. See Appendix A, Section A.3 for a discussion
about the limitations and benefits of a hurdle model in this analysis relative to Tobit or Heckman
selection models.
22Details about the data and wage construction are in Appendix B.
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tion, I measure firm CAD intensity as an employment-weighted share of each firm’s
industry CAD intensity. Because the industry controls are no longer fully co-linear
with the CAD industry measure, I include the level of CAD intensity by firm. To
ensure that the CAD intensity measure is not confounded by the extent to which
an industry uses more complex or differentiated inputs, I also control for the share
of differentiated inputs for a firm’s industry mix using the industry measure from
Nunn (2007).23
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.11 report results from estimating Equation (4.2)
on the subsets of firms that source offshore and domestically respectively. Firm use
of electronic networks does not have a statistically significant relationship with the
extent of offshored production for firms that primarily offshore. In contrast, for firms
that primarily source domestically, use of electronic networks is associated with an
8.5 percent increase in their import share. For both samples, adding an interaction
between electronic networks and CAD intensity results in a statistically insignificant
relationship between communication technology and the degree of offshoring.
The estimated coefficients also suggest that the extent of offshore production
by firms that primarily source from foreign locations is independent of firms’ dis-
tance to a deep water port or border crossing. Although three of the four distance
coefficients have the expected negative sign, they are all imprecisely estimated and
therefore not statistically different from zero. It is important to interpret these re-
sults in context of the estimates in Section 4.3. Firms that source primarily offshore
23I use the liberal definition of the fraction of inputs not sold on an exchange and not reference
priced.
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are closer to deep water ports and Mexican border crossings, but their import share
is independent of these distances. In contrast, the extent of offshored production is
significantly decreasing in distance from a deep water port for firms that primarily
fragment domestically. Relative to firms that are 50 miles from a port, the import
share by firms that are 50 to 200 miles away is 15 percent lower, and the share for
firms over 200 miles away is 27 percent lower. The import share is also 34 percent
lower for domestic fragmenters that are more than 50 miles from a Canadian border
crossing.
The relative foreign wage has the expected negative sign and is statistically
significant for both firms that primarily offshore and for firms that primarily source
domestically. For offshoring firms, a ten percent increase in their average relative
foreign wage is associated with a 1.8 percent lower import share. For firms that
source primarily domestically, a ten percent increase in their average relative foreign
wage is associated with a 2.7 percent decrease in their import share. This association
is consistent with the model’s prediction, but as explained above, should not be
interpreted as proof of a causal relationship.
Thus far, the empirical results are consistent with many of the model’s pre-
dicted equilibrium relationships. Labor cost saving motives are evident in producers’
decision about whether or not to fragment production and offshore, as well as the ex-
tent to which they offshore, conditional on fragmentation. Distance to foreign entry
points is also an important factor in whether or not a producer offshores the ma-
jority of its fragmented production. For firms that fragment primarily domestically,
distance is also related to the extent to which firms offshore production.
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The role of technology is more nuanced. Technology facilitates communication
between producers and suppliers about inputs’ design and production requirements,
thereby increasing the probability a producer will fragment production. However,
producers’ ability to leverage the communication advantages that technology confers
appears to be higher when sourcing from domestic rather than foreign locations.
This relationship is evident in the extensive margin results where, conditional on
fragmenting, plants that use electronic networks in CAD intensive industries are
less likely to offshore. The intensive margin results in this section also suggest
that communication technology has a limited impact on the degree to which a
firm offshores its production. In the next section, I use firm-country level import
data to assess whether the the apparent decreased effectiveness of communication
technology in sourcing from offshore relative to domestic locations may be driven
by heterogeneity in foreign locations’ technology.
4.6 Location of offshore production
In this section, I re-assess firms’ decision about where to locate their frag-
mented production using variation in firms’ foreign sourcing locations. I aggregate
the import data to the firm-country level and construct an indicator equal to one
if a firm sources from a given country. The dataset includes an observation for
every potential firm-country import combination. I regress the indicator on firm
characteristics (XF ), country characteristics (XS), and firm-country interactions
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(XF ×XS):
Pr(yi,s = 1|Xi,s) = θ + βFXF + βSXS + βFS(XF ×XS), (4.3)
where yi,s = 1 if firm i imports from country s. The firm variables, XF , include
the log of value added productivity, electronic network use, the interaction between
electronic networks and industry CAD intensity, and the industry share of differen-
tiated inputs.24 The country variables, XS, include relative wages, human capital,
and a country technology measure. I interact the firm level technology variables
with country technology to assess whether the impact of firm technology on the
probability of sourcing from a given location depends upon that country’s level of
technology. The interaction terms, XF × XS, also include the minimum distance
between each firm and country.
I measure country technology as the number of secure internet servers in 2007
in each country from the World Bank World Development Indicators. This variable
is similar to one used by Freund and Weinhold (2002), who find an important role
for a country’s internet penetration in explaining variation in countries’ growth
of U.S. services trade. The number of internet servers in a country represents a
measure of countries’ communication technology infrastructure. In this dimension,
an assessment of its importance in trade complements Limão and Venables (1999),
who show that transportation infrastructure is a significant determinant of trade
24Since the focus of this analysis is on the interaction terms, I use a continuous productivity
measure to facilitate the disclosure analysis.
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flows.25 I calculate the minimum distance between each firm and each country
using latitudes and longitudes from the CEPII.26 The relative foreign wage comes
from the same data described in Section 4.5, but here each firm faces the same wage
for a given industry-country combination. Because the model assumes homogeneous
labor, I control for country human capital with an updated version of the Hall and
Jones (1999) measure.27
Since the objective of this section is to assess whether the effectiveness of
firm level technology depends upon the level of technology in a given country, I
use country or firm fixed effects and focus on the interaction terms. This approach
controls for all possible omitted country or firm characteristics and is therefore less
susceptible to reverse causality and spurious correlation problems. As in Section
4.2, I estimate Equation (4.3) using a linear probability model.28
Table 4.12 presents results from estimating Equation (4.3) on the subset of
firms that primarily purchase CMS from offshore and domestic locations respec-
tively. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates using country fixed effects, which allow
for a quantification of the role of firm technology in the probability of sourcing from
25The measure of country communication technology also relates to Golub, Jones, and
Kierzkowski (2007), who document a role for countries’ technology infrastructure in exports and
FDI.
26The data are available here: www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. I use lati-
tude and longitude for the largest city in each country. Firm latitude and longitude is based on
the closest manufacturing plant in the firm.
27I use the education data from Barro and Lee (2000) to construct a measure for 2000 since this
is the most recent data available. Human capital measures tend to be correlated over time, but
this measure is more relevant than the original Hall and Jones (1999) variable based on 1989 data.
28OLS is preferable in this context due to the inclusion of firm and country fixed effects. Probit
estimates with fixed effects are inconsistent. In addition the marginal effects for interaction terms
vary by observation making them difficult to summarize (see Ai and Norton (2003)). Finally, both
probit and logit models suffer from perfect separation that occurs when a firm or country dummy
predicts an outcome perfectly. There is no appealing solution for the separation problem in the
analysis here with fixed effects. See Zorn (2005) for a discussion of this issue.
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a given country. The interactions between firm and country technology are posi-
tive and significant for both samples. Figure 4.2a plots the full effect of electronic
network use for offshoring firms evaluated at different levels of country technology.
While using electronic networks has a zero or negative effect on the probability of
sourcing from countries with a small number of servers, such as Bangladesh, their
use increases the probability of sourcing from a high technology country like Japan
by over two percentage points. Figure 4.2b depicts a similar relationship between
industry CAD intensity and country technology. To illustrate magnitudes, increas-
ing CAD intensity from its level in the “other apparel” industry to its level in the
“semi-conductor machinery” industry is associated with no increase in the probabil-
ity of sourcing from a country with Bangladesh’s technology, but a 6.6 percentage
point increase in the probability of sourcing from a country with Japan’s level of
technology.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.12 report estimates of Equation (4.3) with firm
fixed effects. The firm-country interactions are positive and statistically significant
in this specification as well. Figure 4.3 shows the differential impact of country
technology on firms’ sourcing strategies. The figure plots the percentage point im-
pact of a one unit increase in log of servers on the probability a firm will source
from a particular country and shows how this impact varies by firm and industry
technology. The probability a firm will source from a given country is increasing in
the number of servers in that country, but the effect of servers is larger for firms that
use electronic networks and is increasing in industry CAD intensity. To illustrate
the implied magnitudes from the figure, an increase in country technology equiva-
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lent to increasing Bangladesh’s number of servers to the level in Japan is associated
with a 14 percentage point increase in the probability a firm in the “other apparel”
industry sources from that country, and a 25 percentage point increase for a firm in
the “semi-conductor machinery” industry.
The results presented in Table 4.12 are also consistent with an important role
for distance. The estimates with country fixed effects, presented in columns 1 and
2, exploit differences in firms’ distance to a given country that arise from variation
in firms’ geographic distribution across the U.S. They suggest that doubling the
firm-specific distance to a country is associated with 2.6 or 1.9 percentage point
decrease in the probability of sourcing from that country for offshoring and domestic
fragmenters respectively. The estimates with firm fixed effects exploit the variation
in distance to different countries for a given firm. Although the coefficients have the
expected negative sign, they are not statistically significant.
4.7 Assessing the relative importance of technology, distance and
wages
In this section, I assess the relative importance of wages, technology, and dis-
tance in firms’ fragmentation and offshoring decisions. To perform the analysis,
I calculate the share of the explained variation attributable to each of these key
determinants. For example, to assess the importance of wage variation in a given
estimation, I first calculate ŷ, the predicted value of the dependent variable for
each observation, using actual values of independent variables. Next, I re-calculate
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predicted values using the actual wage values for each observation, but holding all
other independent variables at their sample means. Letting ŷiw denote this predicted
value for observation i, the share of the explained variation accounted for by the ac-
tual wage variation in the data is then the sample analogue of V AR(ŷiw)/V AR(ŷi).
When multiple variables capture the effect of distance or technology, I calculate the
predicted values with all distance or technology variables evaluated at actual values
and all other independent variables held at their means. Since these calculations do
not incorporate covariances between independent variables, they do not represent a
perfect decomposition and the fractions of the variation explained by different vari-
ables will not necessarily add to one. However, the analysis provides an informative
quantification of the relative importance of the key explanatory variables.
Table 4.13 presents results of the simplified variance decomposition for the
main results from each set of estimations. The top panel corresponds to the IV
estimates for the probability a plant will fragment production (Table 4.5) and the
probability it will offshore (Table 4.8). The first row reports results for the speci-
fication with no interaction between plant use of electronic networks and industry
CAD intensity and shows that wage variation accounts for one and two percent
of the explained variation in fragmentation and offshoring decisions respectively.
Technology, measured by plant use of electronic networks, accounts for 28 percent
of the explained variation in plants’ fragmentation decision and 24 percent of the
explained variation in offshoring. Distance explains only one percent of the vari-
ation in the fragmentation decision, and two percent of the explained variation of
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offshoring.29 The second row shows that when the effect of electronic networks is
allowed to vary by CAD intensity, technology accounts for 36 and 47 percent of the
explained variation in fragmentation and offshoring respectively. Variation in com-
munication technology accounts for much larger shares of the explained variation
in plants’ decision to break up their production process or source from overseas,
relative to both distance and labor cost savings motives.
The bottom panel of Table 4.13 presents shares of the explained variation of
firms’ imports over sales for the four specifications in Table 4.11. The left hand side
shows variance shares for firms that purchase CMS primarily domestically, while the
right hand side has shares for firms that primarily offshore. For both types of firms,
wages account for the largest share of variation. Depending upon the specification,
wages’ share of the explained variation ranges from .11 to .17. Variation in distance
between a firm and the closest foreign entry points is also important, accounting
for approximately 5 percent of the explained variation in all specifications. Tech-
nology only accounts for a non-trivial portion of the explained variation when it
includes the electronic networks interaction, and since these interactions are statis-
tically insignificant, the share of explained variation is less instructive. These results
suggest that while technology is the most relevant determinant in producers’ deci-
sion about whether or not to fragment and offshore, labor cost differences are most
the important factor in explaining the degree to which firms offshore, conditional
on fragmentation.
29The distance measure is more relevant for the relative costs of foreign sourcing. The low share




Communication technology has the potential to lower fragmentation costs by
facilitating coordination and communication across locations. Consistent with this
notion, the empirical results show that plant use of electronic networks to coordi-
nate shipments increases the probability of fragmentation by 18 percentage points.
To address the possibility of endogenous technology choice, I focus on the ability
of communication technology to facilitate fragmentation through improved com-
munication about product specifications and production processes. Using industry
variation in CAD intensity as a measure of a firm’s ability to specify its production
process in an electronic format, I find evidence consistent with this mechanism. The
differential impact of electronic communication on the probability of fragmenting in
CAD intensive industries is almost 20 percentage points higher than the impact in
low CAD industries.
While the evidence in this chapter is consistent with a strong role for commu-
nication technology in a firm’s fragmentation decision, it also shows that technol-
ogy’s impact on the probability of offshoring is more nuanced. In particular, firms
that use electronic networks in CAD intensive industries are less likely to offshore
their fragmented production than firms in low CAD industries. One explanation for
this result is that successful use of electronic communication and CAD technology
depends upon the quality of technology in the sourcing country. Since offshore lo-
cations’ average technology is lower than U.S. technology, this could drive the lower
impact of electronic networks on the probability of offshoring by firms in CAD in-
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tensive industries. Consistent with this hypothesis, estimates using disaggregated
country-import data show that the effect of firm communication and information
technology on the probability of offshoring is increasing in country level technology.
As a result, a single parameter is unlikely to capture the true impact of technologi-
cal improvements, since this impact varies substantially across firms, industries, and
countries.
The results in this chapter also indicate that potential labor cost savings are
a significant determinant of firms’ fragmentation decisions. Plants in high wage
locations are more likely to fragment production domestically, while conditional on
fragmentation, plants in low wage states are more likely to offshore. These results
suggest that plants are geographically differentiated with arbitrage opportunities to
purchase labor from other locations. The paper shows that the arbitrage opportu-
nities depend on communication technology. Given the rapid progress in developing
communication technology to date, fragmentation is likely to become more common
in the future as more firms seek to exploit its potential to lower production costs. To
the extent that technological advances require matching technology or skills in the
sourcing location, however, these advances will not necessarily displace U.S. jobs,






























































































































































































































































































Figure 4.3: Differential impact of country technology on probability of sourcing from
country s, by industry CAD intensity
Notes: Estimates based on regressions of the probability a firm imports from a given
country, with firm fixed effects.
Tables
Table 4.1: Average distance between a plant and its closest potential suppliers, by
CMS purchase status
MSPa
Deep water Border Crossings
Ports Canada Mexico
No Purchases 2.2 286 469 992
Domestic Purchases 1.6 302 431 1,028
Offshore Purchases 1.6 248 483 950
All Plants 2.0 290 459 1,001
Distances are in miles. a Closest manufacturing service provider.
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Table 4.2: Plant use of electronic networks, by year and 2007 CMS purchase status
Share of Plants
2002 2007
No Purchases 0.17 0.36
Domestic Purchases 0.22 0.51
Offshore Purchases 0.33 0.61
Table 4.3: Share of plants in each 2007 CMS status, by 2002 electronic network use
and 2002 CMS purchase status
Networks in 2002=NO Networks in 2002=YES
2002 CMS Purchases 2002 CMS Purchases
2007 CMS Purchases No Yes No Yes
None 0.72 0.17 0.08 0.03
Domestic Purchases 0.51 0.34 0.07 0.08
Offshore Purchases 0.41 0.30 0.14 0.14
Note: Table limited to single unit firms in 2007 since 2002 question only
includes CMS purchases from another firm. 2002 CMS question asks whether
plant purchased CMS from another firm.
Table 4.4: Share of plants in each 2007 CMS status, by 2002 electronic network use
and 2002 offshore CMS purchase status
Networks in 2002=NO Networks in 2002=YES
2002 Offshore Purchases 2002 Offshore Purchases
2007 CMS Purchases No Yes No Yes
None 0.82 0.03 0.14 0.01
Domestic Purchases 0.74 0.06 0.19 0.02
Offshore Purchases 0.57 0.12 0.25 0.06
Note: 2002 offshore question asks whether plant sent any partially com-
pleted products to a foreign facility for processing.
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Table 4.5: Probability that a plant fragments production
Dependent variable is 1 if plant i in industry j and state h fragments production
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
Alla IV sample Baseline CAD Demand Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Electronic networksi 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.183*** 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.255***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.019) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
×ln(CADj) 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
ln(wageh) 0.137** 0.212*** 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.167*** 0.096***
(0.051) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037)
ln(V AProdi) Q2 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.117*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.120***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Q3 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.155*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.158***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Distance to MSP
5-20 miles -0.017** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
20+ miles -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.031***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Distance to portc
51-200 miles -0.008 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009** -0.006
(0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
200+ miles -0.001 0.014 0.009* 0.008 0.004 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
50+ miles to border w/
Mexico 0.006 -0.019** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.042***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Canada -0.025 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006









NAICS 6 controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
N 105,500 71,600 71,600 71,600 71,600 71,600
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance
respectively. IV regressions instrument for electronic networks and productivity using lagged
2002 values. a Regression for full sample, weighted by the inverse probability of inclusion
in sample. b Distance between plant i and closest deepwater port; plants within 50 miles is
omitted category. c Share of all workers in state with at least a college degree. d Share of
all production workers in state with at least a high school degree. N rounded for disclosure
avoidance.
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Table 4.6: First stage regressions for the probability of fragmentation
Each column is the first stage regression for the listed endogenous variable
Electronic networks only With CAD interaction
Instruments
ln(V APi Terciles) Elec.Netsi ln(V APi Terciles) Elec.Netsi
Q2 Q3 Indicator Q2 Q3 Indicator ×ln(CADj)
ln(V APi) Q2 0.156*** 0.089*** 0.043*** 0.156*** 0.089*** 0.043*** -0.060***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Q3 -0.049*** 0.391*** 0.063*** -0.049*** 0.391*** 0.063*** -0.082***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Elec netwksi -0.007* 0.039*** 0.263*** -0.012** 0.042*** 0.277*** -0.088
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.064)
×ln(CADj) -0.004 0.003 0.013*** 0.171***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.056)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.51
Shea’s Partial R2 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.03
F-Statistica 1431 374 1217 1083 281 938 736
Notes: Each column reports the coefficients and standard errors for the excluded instruments in
the first stage regression of the respective endogenous variable. Instruments are 2002 lagged values.
Standard errors clustered by state. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. a
F-Statistic is for a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to zero.
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Table 4.7: Correlations between industry CAD intensity and industry-level variables
CAD ShrDesSup ShrDesCo KI SI DI Off
Share designs 0.49
w/suppliers 0.00
Share designs 0.54 0.23
w/comp. units 0.00 0.00
Capital Intensity 0.09 -0.24 0.20
0.04 0.00 0.00
Skill Intensity 0.16 0.25 0.10 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.99
Diff Inputs 0.26 0.35 0.12 -0.37 0.37
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Wholesale imports -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.01 0.15
to sales 0.57 0.62 0.27 0.10 0.92 0.00
Whole/Manf imports -0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.92
to sales 0.54 0.70 0.03 0.13 0.81 0.00 0.00
Notes: Correlation coefficients between industry CAD intensity, the share of manufacturing
plants that use electronic networks to share designs with suppliers, the share that use
networks to share designs with other company units, capital intensity, skill intensity, share
of differentiated inputs, and wholesale firm imports relative to domestic manufactures’ sales.
Details on industry variables are provided in the text. P-values reported in italics.
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Table 4.8: Probability that a plant offshores, conditional on fragmentation
Dependent variable is 1 if plant i in industry j and state h primarily offshores production
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
Alla IV sample Baseline CAD Demand Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Electronic networksi 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.100*** 0.055 0.056 0.057
(0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
×ln(CADj) -0.051 -0.051 -0.051
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
ln(wageh) -0.140*** -0.116*** -0.125*** -0.122*** -0.125*** -0.106**
(0.033) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047)
ln(V AProdi) Q2 0.003 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Q3 0.020*** 0.021** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Distance to MSP
5-20 miles -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
20+ miles -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Distance to portc
51-200 miles -0.012** -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
200+ miles -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
50+ miles to border w/
Mexico -0.093*** -0.123*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.088***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Canada -0.013** -0.011* -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011*









NAICS 6 controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
N 30,700 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500
Notes: Standard errors clustered by state. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance
respectively. IV regressions instrument for electronic networks and productivity using lagged
2002 values. a Regression for full sample, weighted by the inverse probability of inclusion
in sample. b Distance between plant i and closest deep water port; plants within 50 miles
is omitted category. c Share of all workers in state with at least a college degree. d Share of
all production workers in state with at least a high school degree. N rounded for disclosure
avoidance.
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Table 4.9: First stage regressions for probability of offshoring
Each column is the first stage regression for the listed endogenous variable
Electronic networks only With CAD interaction
Instruments
ln(V APi Terciles) Elec.Netsi ln(V APi Terciles) Elec.Netsi
Q2 Q3 Dummy Q2 Q3 Dummy ×ln(CADj)
ln(V APi) Q2 0.140*** 0.097*** 0.013 0.140*** 0.097*** 0.013 -0.060***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Q3 -0.080*** 0.398*** 0.032*** -0.080*** 0.397*** 0.032*** -0.082***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
Elec netwksi -0.014* 0.049*** 0.240*** -0.030** 0.061*** 0.267*** -0.088
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.064)
×ln(CADj) -0.016 0.013* 0.027** 0.171***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.056)
Adj. R2 0.09 0.25 0.12 0.09 0.25 0.12 0.51
Shea’s Partial R2 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.04
F-Statistica 570 176 481 462 137 371 403
Notes: Each column reports the coefficients and standard errors for the excluded instruments in
the first stage regression of the respective endogenous variable. Instruments are 2002 lagged values.
Standard errors clustered by state. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. a
F-Statistic is for a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to zero.
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Table 4.10: Robustness checks for probability of fragmenting and offshoring
Dependent variable is 1 if plant i in industry j and state h:
Fragments production Offshores, conditional on fragmenting
10+ yr. olds Non-auto Adopters 10+ yr. olds Non-auto Adopters
Elec. networksi 0.173*** 0.185*** 0.126*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.150***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.034) (0.017) (0.018) (0.038)
ln(wageh) 0.172*** 0.167*** 0.124*** -0.119** -0.131*** -0.177**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.039) (0.048) (0.047) (0.075)
ln(V AProdi) Q2 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.074* 0.007 0.002 -0.011
(0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019) (0.049)
Q3 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.061*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.052*
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.028)
Distance to MSP
5-20 miles -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.021*** 0.002 0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
20+ miles -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.020* 0.008 0.002 0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
Distance to portc
51-200 miles -0.006 -0.003 0.010 -0.014* -0.012 -0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
200+ miles 0.010* 0.013** 0.017** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
50+ miles to border w/
Mexico -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.097*** -0.084*** -0.096*** -0.091***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.030)
Canada -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
NAICS 6 controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.03
N 69,000 63,000 22,000 19,000 21,000 5,000
Notes: 10+ yrs consists of plants that have been in the same location for at least ten years.
Non-auto excludes plants in automotive manufacturing industries. Adopters consists of all
single-unit firms that did not fragment production in 2002. Standard errors clustered by state.
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. N rounded for disclosure avoidance.
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Table 4.11: Extent of offshored production





for firm f in industry j
CMS purchases primarily:
Offshore Domestic
Electronic networksf 0.070 -0.145 0.085** 0.082
(0.107) (0.180) (0.043) (0.069)
×ln(CADj) -0.232 -0.005
(0.156) (0.061)
ln(V A Prodf ) -0.004 -0.013 -0.043 -0.043
(0.070) (0.070) (0.033) (0.033)
Distancef to port
a
51-200 miles 0.150 0.154 -0.149** -0.149**
(0.151) (0.150) (0.066) (0.065)
200+ miles -0.053 -0.044 -0.254*** -0.252***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.048) (0.048)
> 50 miles from border w/a
Mexico -0.287 -0.297 -0.232 -0.224
(0.235) (0.235) (0.160) (0.159)
Canada -0.194 -0.217 -0.343*** -0.344***
(0.203) (0.203) (0.075) (0.075)
ln(wagef/US) -0.182*** -0.175*** -0.265*** -0.265***






Industry controls yes yes yes yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
N 1,200 1,200 9,300 9,300
Notes: *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. a Dis-
tance between foreign entry point and the closest manufacturing establish-
ment in the firm; firms with a plant within 50 miles is omitted category. b
Firm’s industry share of differentiated input use. N rounded for disclosure
avoidance.
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Table 4.12: Offshore sourcing location selection
Dependent variable is 1 if firm f , in industry j, imports from country s
Firms’ CMS purchases are primarily:
Offshore Domestic Offshore Domestic




×ln(Serverss) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(CADj) -0.008*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
×ln(Serverss) 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(V A Prodf ) 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Distanceafs -0.026** -0.019** -0.018 -0.026
(0.011) (0.009) (0.030) (0.023)








Country fixed effects yes yes no no
Firm fixed effects no no yes yes
Adj. R-Squared 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.09
N 270,000 363,900 103,000 1,382,000
Notes: Standard errors clustered by country. There are 185 country clusters
in columns 1 and 2, and 70 country clusters in columns 3 and 4. *, **,
*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. a Distance between a
country’s main city and the closest manufacturing establishment in the firm.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.1 Substitutability of CMS purchases and standardized inputs
The CMS data correspond to fragmentation of customized production pro-
cesses, so plants that report no purchases may perform all the requisite physical
transformation activities to make their good, or they may be able to purchase stan-
dardized, off-the-shelf inputs. To assess whether CMS purchases can be substituted
with standardized inputs, I examine their relationship with plants’ purchases of
materials. Plants’ purchases of CMS are positively correlated with their material
purchases, suggesting that CMS purchases are not substitutes for material inputs.
To control for the possibility that standardized inputs are substitutes for CMS pur-
chases in the empirical section, I use six digit NAICS industry fixed effects so that
the estimates reflect within industry differences in the probability of fragmentation.
The six digit NAICS industry controls represent a very detailed classification that
should capture the importance of customized inputs in production. It is possible,
however, that some firms within an industry produce higher quality goods that re-
quire more customized inputs. In this case, the estimated coefficients on productivity
may reflect higher quality, rather than greater production efficiency. In firm-level
regressions with multi-unit firms that span multiple industries, I can only control
for industry at the four digit level. In these cases, I also include the Nunn (2007)
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measure of an industry’s need for differentiated inputs as a control for industries’
demand for customized production processes.
A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Share of fragmentation and distance










A.2.2 Share of fragmentation and technology





























If wages are unaffected by technology, then the second set of square brackets are zero
(but you see how skill-biased technological change would have interesting effects on
offshored production). Here I assume that dρ
dη
= 0 which means dk̄
dη
< 0.
A.2.3 Homogeneous task production
The model assumes that productivity heterogeneity affects the transformation
of the input M into output q, but does not alter firms’ ability to convert labor into
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tasks. This assumption is similar to Antràs and Helpman (2004), where all suppliers
make inputs one-to-one from labor, regardless of the productivity of the firm that
owns them. The effect of extending the impact of productivity to task production
depends upon firms’ sourcing choices. Under integrated production, heterogeneity
in task production would amplify the profitability and size differences that produc-
tivity heterogeneity induces without changing the model’s basic result. The effect
of extending task productivity heterogeneity under fragmented production would
depend upon whether, and the extent to which, firms transfer their productivity to
their input suppliers. With costless transferability regardless of ownership, task het-
erogeneity would simply amplify the existing results. If firm ownership or supplier
industry affect transferability, then firms will weigh these additional fragmentation
costs against the benefits described above.1
A.2.4 Multi-dimensional task costs
When firms can source each task from a different location and fragmentation
costs vary along two task-specific dimensions, it is no longer possible to order tasks
by their costs. Locations vary in terms of their distance to the firm, relative wage and
technological capabilities. Task-specific cost factors, such as weight and complexity,
may interact with location-specific variables to induce non-monotonicities in costs
across locations and tasks. For example, suppose final good production requires
complex plastic screws that are communication intensive but relatively light, and
1See Fort (2010) for an analysis of how firms’ ability to transfer productivity to new plants
varies across industries.
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large metal frames that are straightforward to construct but heavy. Plastic screws
will be more expensive than frames to fragment from a nearby MSP, but metal
frames will be relatively more costly to purchase from a distant supplier. Maximizing
variable profits when there are three potential fragmentation strategies therefore
entails identifying the lowest cost sourcing location for each task. A firm will prefer




τ(δs2 , ωk, ηs2)
τ(δs1 , ωk, ηs1)
, (A.3)
conditional on wh > αws1τk(δs1 , ωk, ηs1 , ρj). Equation (3.7) shows that as long frag-
menting is cheaper than integrated production, the decision to source from one
location over another depends only the relative costs and benefits of those loca-
tions. The share of tasks fragmented from a given location s will simply be the total
number of tasks for which s is the cheapest sourcing location over all tasks.
A.3 Hurdle models
Although the hurdle model relies on the assumption that ln(y) follows a clas-
sical linear model, it is more general than Tobit because it does not constrain the
effect of the independent variables on the probability of y > 0 to have the same
sign and relative magnitudes as the effect of the independent variables on the size of
ln(y). Using a standard hurdle model approach, the E(y|x) = Φ(xγ)exp(xβ+σ2/2),
where γ are the coefficients from a probit of the probability that y > 0, β are the
coefficients from the OLS regression of ln(y) on x for positive values of y, and σ are
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B.1 Contract Manufacturing Question
The CMS purchase question is the third part of the special inquiries section,


































































Did this establishment purchase contract manufacturing services from other companies or other establishments








































































CERTIFICATION - This report is substantially accurate and was prepared in accordance with the instructions.
 
 
























































Table B.1 presents information on plants in the CMS sample relative to those
outside the sample. The first three columns provide participation shares and show
that while the CMS sample comprise of 54 percent of U.S. manufacturing establish-
ments (excluding administrative records), it covers 75 percent of sales and 71 percent
of employment. The last three columns of Table B.1 present summary statistics by
CMS non-response type. As expected, establishments not asked the CMS question
are substantially smaller than plants in the sample. To address potential selection
bias in the analyses, I use a number of establishment-level variables, including sales,
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employment, age, firm age, multi-unit firm status, industry, and industry employ-
ment interactions, to estimate, via logit, the probability that an establishment will
be in the CMS sample. I then predict the probability that an observation is in the
sample and use the inverse of the predicted probability as a weight in the subsequent
empirical analyses.
B.3 Variable Descriptions
This section provides detailed information about the data sources and con-
struction methodology for variables used in chapters 2 and 4.
B.3.1 Electronic networks
I measure whether a plant used electronic networks in 2007 with a dummy
variable equal to one for plants that report using an electronic network to control or
coordinate shipments. The precise question from the 2007 Census of Manufactures
is:
 
If not shown, please enter your 11-digit Census File






















Did this plant use any electronic network to control or coordinate the flow of any of the shipments of goods reported






































No - Go to 7
 
 
Percent of total reported in 5 , line A that were ordered, or whose movement was





























Full- and part-time employees working at this establishment whose payroll was reported on Internal Revenue
Service Form 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, and filed under the Employer Identification









Full- or part-time leased employees whose payroll was filed under an employee leasing company's EIN.
 
 
Temporary staffing obtained from a staffing service.
 
 



















































































































































































Number of hours worked by production workers (Annual hours








































I measure plants’ use of electronic networks in 2002 using data from this similar
question in the 2002 Census of Manufactures:























If a figure is $1,025,628.79:
 
 



































































Report the value of products shipped for export. Include shipments to
customers in the Panama Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and U.S. possessions, as well as the value of products shipped to exporters
or other wholesalers for export. Also, include the value of products sold
to the U.S. Government to be shipped to foreign governments. Exclude



















Did any of the amount reported in 4 , line A include e-commerce sales, shipments, or receipts? (E-commerce
sales, shipments, or receipts are online orders for products from customers where price and/or terms of the sale
are accepted or negotiated over an Internet, Extranet, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) network, electronic mail, or









No - Go to 6
 
 
Percent of total value of products shipped and other receipts reported in 4 , line A using e-












control or coordinate shipments, data from the the 1999 Annual Survey of Manufac-
tures (ASM) Computer Survey Network Use Supplement (CNUS) show that plants’
use of electronic networks to sell goods is correlated with their use of networks to
purchase inputs. I find that plants’ acceptance of online orders for their manu-
factured products has a correlation coefficient of .23 with their use of networks to
purchase materials or supplies. In addition, 32 percent of plants that sell goods over
networks also use networks to provide information about their design specifications
to external suppliers, compared to only 16 percent of plants that do not sell goods
over networks. The same pattern (30 percent vs. 16 percent) holds for plants that
do or do not use networks to purchase inputs. These findings support the premise
that plant use of electronic networks to control or coordinate shipments is a valid
proxy for a plant’s use of technology to communicate with suppliers.
B.3.2 CAD Industry Intensity
I measure industry intensity of Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer
Aided Engineering (CAE) using the Computer Survey Network Use Supplement
(CNUS) from the 1999 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The CNUS asked
manufacturing establishments a number of questions about their use of different
types of technology. I use the following question to identify whether a particular
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Name and telephone number of person to contact regarding this report. 
Please print or type. Area code Number Extension
For each of the following computer networked business processes, please indicate below whether



















Access to your products or catalogs
Ordering by your customers
Payment by your customers




























Please identify any other important computer networked business processes not listed above.
No E-mail address available Don’t know E-mail address
Please provide an electronic mail (E-mail) address for this plant or the person completing this form.
Access to vendors’ products or catalogs
Ordering from vendors
Payment to vendors
Vendor management of your inventory
Online bidding





E-mail within the plant
E-mail with vendors or customers
Employee training
Employee recruiting
Employee management of own benefits (retirement, payroll deductions, etc.)
Requests for maintenance or repairs
For each of the following items, to whom does this plant provide information online




















Integrated CAD/CAE (Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Engineering)
Design of the production process
Production scheduling
Production monitoring
Test and acceptance of product









Name and telephone number of person to contact regarding this report. 
Please print or type. Area code Number Extension
For each of the following computer networked business processes, please indicate below whether



















Access to your products or catalogs
Ordering by your customers
Payment by your customers




























Please identify any other important computer networked business processes not listed above.
No E-mail address available Don’t know E-mail address
Please provide an electronic mail (E- ail) address for this plant or the person completing this form.
Access to vendors’ products or catalogs
Ordering from vendors
Payment to vendors
Vendor management of your inventory
Online bidding





E-mail within the plant
E-mail with vendors or customers
Employee tr i ing
Employee recruiting
Employee management of own benefits (retirement, payroll deductions, etc.)
Requests for maintenance or repairs
For each of the following items, to whom does this plant provide information online




















Integrated CAD/CAE (Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Engineering)
Design of the production process
Production scheduling
Production monitoring
Test and acceptance of product






I construct an indicator for all plants that used CAD in 1999 and calculate the
share of plants in an indus ry using CAD relative to plants that did not use CAD and
had no plans to use it by 2002. I do not include plants that report planning to use
CAD by 12/2002. The ASM is not a representative sample, so I use weights provided
in the CNUS to avoid a y potential selection bias. I calculate the CAD measure
at the NAICS 6 level. The mean of the 473 manufacturing industries is .44, with a
standard deviation of .25 and a range of 1. The least CAD intensive industries are
in food manufacturing, while the most CAD intensive are in machinery, aerospace,
and automotive manufacturing.
B.3.3 U.S. Wage Data
I use 2006 U.S. wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) Survey to measure production worker wages by state
and industry. The state level data provide the mean wage by six digit occupation.
I limit the data to the 110 “Production occupations” and match them to national
OES data on occupations and four digit NAICS industries. I use the national data to
determine the occupational intensity of each industry, which I calculate as the share
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of workers in a given occupation in the industry’s total employment of production
occupation workers. When an occupation is listed as an input into an industry but
the employment information for the occupation is missing, I treat its employment
share as zero.1 I match the national share of each occupation within an industry to
the state-occupation level wage data. I then compute the state-industry wage as the
average, weighted by the national industry share, of each occupation’s wage within








where o denotes occupations. While the missing employment information may lead
to measurement error in an industry’s average wage, the error will be consistent
across states.
In principle, this methodology avoids attributing wage differences across in-
dustries and states to compositional differences in a state’s employees. In practice,
occupations are unevenly distributed across states so that some states do not have
employment, and therefore wage values, for certain occupations. For example, only
three states have nuclear power operators, seven have shoe machine operators, and
15 have semiconductor processors.2 In addition, some states are missing wage data
for some of their occupations. To ensure that the shares of employment in each
1For example, the national OES file lists “Butchers and meat cutters” as an input for Animal
Food manufacturing, but has no employment information for the occupation. I therefore assign a
zero share to that occupation as an input into Animal Food manufacturing.
2The uneven distribution of occupations across the country is consistent with production frag-
mentation. It also suggests an important role for the substitutability of labor in a given location,
for a given industry. I do not address this dimension of variation as a determinant of fragmentation.
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state-industry combination sum to one, I use the average state wage for the five
digit occupation (or four digit occupation if the five digit occupation wage is miss-
ing) to which the missing occupation belongs.
The average production worker wage across states and industries is $14.58.
The lowest wage, $9.67, is for workers in the Cut and Sew apparel industry in
Montana. The highest wage, $25.36, is for workers in the Petroleum and Coal
Products manufacturing industry in Alaska. State fixed effects explain 33 percent of
the variation in the wage, while industry fixed effects explain 56 percent of the wage
variation in the data. Averaged over industry, the mean state wage is $14.58, with a
standard deviation of $1.08. The lowest wages are $12.44 and $12.96 in South Dakota
and Mississippi respectively, while the highest wage is $17.97 in Alaska, followed by
Delaware, Washington, Michigan and Connecticut, all with average wages above
$16.
B.3.4 Foreign Wages
The foreign wage data are from the International Labor Organization and
available for 1983-2003. I use monthly wages in US $s provided by Oostendorp
(2005). I construct relative foreign wages for each industry-occupation as w∗/wUS,
where w∗ denotes the wage in a foreign country. This relative wage follows the theo-
retical framework and provides a unit free measure that applies to specific industries
and occupations. To the extent that skill varies by industry and occupation, the rel-
ative wage controls for compositional differences in countries’ wages that are driven
113
by workers of varying skill levels. I primarily use wages from 2000 because it is the
most recent year of complete data. When the 2000 data are missing for a given
country-industry-occupation, I use data from the closest year. Because the relative
wage is unit free, it is not affected by dollar inflation, though significant changes in
the exchange rate over time may cause measurement problems for data substitution
from other years.
I match the ILO data to NAICS industries by hand and average over industries
to obtain a relative foreign wage in a given NAICS industry. The industries vary
from three digit to six digit NAICS. Despite substituting missing values with data
from alternate years, there are still missing data. When available, I replace missing
data with the average wage for a higher level of NAICS aggregation in a given
country. There are some countries for which no data are available. Since identifying
sourcing locations is a primary focus of this paper, country-specific characteristics
are critical and I therefore do not impute data for the missing countries. When I
construct the firm import-weighted average relative wage, I drop firms for which 50
percent or more of its imports have no wage. For the remaining firms, I re-normalize
















I measure state skill differences using 2007 data from the American Community
Survey (ACS). For both total workers in a state and for the subsample of production
workers in a state, I calculate a)the share of workers with at least a college degree; b)
the share of workers with at least an associate’s degree; and c) the share of workers
with at least a high school degree.
B.3.6 Manufacturing service providers
The CMS sample also has information about plants’ primary activity. Treating
all plants that identify their primary activity as “Providing contract manufacturing
services to others”, I calculate the distance between each manufacturing plant in
the CMS sample and the closest manufacturing service provider (MSP). The precise
question I use to identify MSPs is provided below.
 
I also calculate an alternative domestic distance measure as the weighted av-
erage of the minimum distance between a plant and all of its input suppliers. I use
the 2002 BEA I-O tables to identify each plant’s inputs based on the plant’s four
digit NAICS industry. I also use the I-O tables to calculate the share of each input
in production, which I use as a weight. The weighted distance to input suppliers
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is positively correlated with the distance to the closest MSP. Using the weighted
distance in regression analyses in lieu of the MSP distance measure yields similar
results.
B.3.7 Water Ports
I identify all potentially relevant water ports using data from the Maritime
Administration’s Port Import Export Reporting Service (PIERS).3 The data are
collected from vessel manifests and bills of lading and provide imports, measured
by number of shipping containers in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), by port.
There are 122 ports, including both government and non-government shipments by
vessel into and out of U.S. foreign trade zones, the 50 states, District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico. I exclude ports in Puerto Rico since my data are limited to the
50 states. I also exclude the Port of Gramercy, LA since its facility solely handles
green and calcined petroleum coke (see www.jeinc.com/gramercy).
Shipping costs are generally increasing in the distance between a port and the
final import destination, but rates at small ports tend to be substantially higher
than rates at larger ports since they are served by fewer shipping lines. In addition,
many container shipments must come through deep water ports.4 To ensure that
my port list corresponds to viable import channels, I restrict the ports to those with
3The data are available here: www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_
statistics/Data_and_Statistics.htm.
4According to Richard Phillips, CEO of Pilot Freight Services, port-to-port shipping shipping
charges are decreasing in the number of shippers to a specific port. In addition, shipping companies
offer discounts based on total customer volume. Because larger ports support more carriers from
a greater range of sourcing locations, shipping costs at larger ports tend to be substantially lower
than costs at smaller ports.
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a value of imports greater than 100 TEUs. This criterion eliminates 71 ports, 45
with zero imports and only seven with more than 50 TEUs of imports. (I except
Anchorage, Alaska from this exclusion criterion since it imported 92 TEUs in 2007,
but is the largest viable import port in Alaska.) I also identify deep water ports
using a combination of internet searches. Table B.3 lists the 46 ports with at least
100 TEUs of imports in 2007 and the Port of Anchorage. Column 4 identifies the
42 deep water ports.
I obtain latitude and longitude for each port using the Intermodal Terminal
Facility database from the Research and Innovative Technology Administration’s
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (RITA/BTS) National Transportation Atlas
Databases (NTAD) 2010.5 This database is missing Port Manatee, FL and the
Port of Honolulu, HI so I obtain latitude and longitude for these ports from: www.
worldportsource.com/states.php.
B.3.8 Border Crossings
I identify all potential border crossings with Canada and Mexico using border
crossing/entry data from RITA/BTS.6 The data originate from the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, OMR database. There are
86 Canadian and 25 Mexican entry ports into the U.S. I exclude the crossings that
had no truck traffic in 2007 to obtain 82 Canadian and 22 Mexican potential crossing
points. I attach latitudes and longitudes to these crossings using the centroid for
5Data available here: www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_atlas_
database/.
6The data can be downloaded here: http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/
transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html.
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the county in which the port is located. Table B.4 lists the states and counties with
border crossings.
B.4 Probit estimation results
In the paper, I estimate the probability of fragmentation and offshoring using
a linear probability model. Table B.5 presents the marginal effects from estimation
via probit. The estimated marginal effects evaluated at the mean are all similar to
the estimated OLS coefficients.
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Tables
Table B.1: Plant characteristics by response status
Participation Shares Means
Plants Sales Emp Salesa Emp ln(VAP)
In CMS Sample 0.54 0.75 0.71 36,778 86 4.56
Out of CMS Sample
Not Answered 0.21 0.23 0.24 29,548 77 4.61
Not Asked 0.25 0.02 0.05 2,314 13 4.25
No Info 0.00 0.00 0.00 21,147 61 4.75
All Manufactures 1.00 1.00 1.00 26,638 66 4.50
Notes: Approximately 196,800 manufacturing plants; excludes administrative
records. a Sales in $000s.
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Table B.2: List of excluded wholesale industries
NAICS Code NAICS Description
423210 Furniture Merchant Wholesalers
423220 Home Furnishing Merchant Wholesalers
423410 Photographic Equipment and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers
423420 Office Equipment Merchant Wholesalers
423440 Other Commercial Equipment Merchant Wholesalers
423450 Medical, Dental, and Hospital Equipment and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers
423460 Ophthalmic Goods Merchant Wholesalers
423490 Other Professional Equipment and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers
423710 Hardware Merchant Wholesalers
423720 Plumbing and Heating Equipment and Supplies (Hydronics) Merchant Wholesalers
423730 Warm Air Heating and Air-Conditioning Equip. and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers
423740 Refrigeration Equipment and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers
423840 Industrial Supplies Merchant Wholesalers
423990 Other Miscellaneous Durable Goods Merchant Wholesalers
424610 Plastics Materials and Basic Forms and Shapes Merchant Wholesalers
424690 Other Chemical and Allied Products Merchant Wholesalers
424710 Petroleum Bulk Stations and Terminals
424720 Petroleum and Petroleum Products Merchant Wholesalers
424910 Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers
424990 Other Miscellaneous Nondurable Goods Merchant Wholesalers
425110 Business to Business Electronic Markets
425120 Wholesale Trade Agents and Brokers
Note: These industries were not asked the CMS questions and are therefore excluded from all
analyses.
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Table B.3: Water Ports with Imports
Intermodal Terminal Facility City State
Deep Imports
Watera (TEUs)
1 PORT OF ANCHORAGE Anchorage AK 1 92
2 BNSF-MOBILE-AL Mobile AL 1 34,968
3 PORT OF LONG BEACH Long Beach CA 1 3,686,191
4 PORT OF OAKLAND Oakland CA 1 798,762
5 PORT OF HUENEME Port Hueneme CA 1 17,533
6 YELLOW-SAN DIEGO-CA TERMINAL San Diego CA 1 48,137
7 PORT OF LOS ANGELES San Pedro CA 1 4,323,281
8 PORT OF BRIDGEPORT Bridgeport CT 1 3,002
9 PORT OF WILMINGTON Wilmington DE 1 141,731
10 PORT CANAVERAL Cape Canaveral FL 1 246
11 PORT OF FERNANDINA WHARF Fernandina Beach FL 1 4,126
12 PORT EVERGLADES Fort Lauderdale FL 1 312,427
13 PORT OF FORT PIERCE Fort Pierce FL 2,951
14 PORT OF JACKSONVILLE Jacksonville FL 1 44,005
15 PORT OF MIAMI Miami FL 1 348,394
16 PORT OF PANAMA CITY Panama City FL 21,532
17 PORT OF PALM BEACH Riviera Beach FL 47,223
18 PORT OF TAMPA Tampa FL 1 18,870
19 SAVANNAH-GA-373 N Savannah GA 1 1,077,771
20 NOT IN DATABASE Honolulu HI 1 23,583
21 PORT OF LAKE CHARLES Lake Charles LA 1 279
22 PORT OF NEW ORLEANS New Orleans LA 1 77,280
23 PORT OF BOSTON Boston MA 1 94,224
24 PORT OF BALTIMORE Baltimore MD 1 254,325
25 PORT OF PORTLANT, MAINE Portland ME 1 405
26 PORT OF GULFPORT Gulfport MS 1 104,009
27 PORT OF WILMINGTON-NC Wilmington NC 1 84,693
28 GLOUSTER CITY MARINE TERMINAL Glouster City NJ 1 3,136
29 THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NY & NJ New York NY 1 2,640,303
30 PORT OF PORTLAND Portland OR 1 104,545
31 TRANSFLO-CHESTER-PA Chester PA 1 52,082
32 PORT OF PHILADELPHIA AND CAMDEN Philadelphia PA 1 161,603
33 PORT OF CHARLESTON Charleston SC 1 768,774
34 PORT OF BEAUMONT Beaumont TX 1 296
35 PORT OF CORPUS CHRISTI AUTHORITY Corpus Christi TX 1 599
36 PORT OF FREEPORT Freeport TX 1 31,326
37 PORT OF GALVESTON Galveston TX 1 3,904
38 PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY Houston TX 1 619,561
39 NEWPORT NEWS MARINE TERMINAL Newport News VA 1 28,589
40 NORFOLK INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS Norfolk VA 1 857,033
41 PORT OF RICHMOND-VA Richmond VA 23,179
42 PORT OF EVERETT Everett WA 1 190
43 PORT OF SEATTLE Seattle WA 1 785,643
44 PORT OF TACOMA Tacoma WA 1 722,450
45 PORT OF VANCOUVER, USA Vancouver WA 1 316
46 PORT OF MILWAUKEE Milwaukee WI 140
47 NOT IN DATABASE Port Manatee FL 1 4,127
Source: RITA/BTS National Transportation Atlas and the Maritime Administration. Wa-
ter ports with 100 TEUs or more of imports in 2007 and Port of Anchorage. a Identification
based on internet searches and port-specific websites.
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Table B.4: U.S. Counties with Land Entry Ports
Ports on the Canadian Border
State County State County State County
ID Boundary MT Blaine VT Orleans
ME Aroostook MT Daniels WA Clallam
ME Somerset MT Gallatin WA Ferry
ME Washington MT Glacier WA King
MI Chippewa MT Hill WA Okanogan
MI Oakland MT Liberty WA Pend Oreille
MI St. Clair MT Lincoln WA San Juan
MI Wayne MT Phillips WA Skagit
MN Cook MT Sheridan WA Stevens
MN Kittson MT Toole WA Whatcom
MN Koochiching MT Valley
MN Lake of the Woods ND Bottineau
MN Roseau ND Burke
Ports on the Mexican Border
State County State County State County
NM Dona Ana NM Dona Ana TX Presidio
NM Luna NM Luna TX Starr
TX Cameron TX Cameron TX Val Verde
TX El Paso TX El Paso TX Webb
TX Hidalgo TX Hidalgo
TX Maverick TX Maverick
Source: Source: RITA/BTS border crossing/entry data. Based on
entry ports with truck crossings in 2007.
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Table B.5: Probit Regressions for probability of fragmentation and offshoring
Dependent variable is 1 if establishment
Fragments Offshores
All IV Sample All IV Sample
Electronic networksi 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(wageh) 0.189*** 0.223*** -0.089*** -0.106***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.025) (0.039)
ln(V AProdi) Q2 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Q3 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.024*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Distance to MSP
5-20 miles -0.017*** -0.021*** 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
20+ miles -0.024*** -0.028*** 0.004 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Distance to portc
51-200 miles -0.013** -0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
200+ miles 0.004 0.013** -0.015*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
50+ miles to border w/
Mexico -0.021*** -0.038*** -0.076*** -0.081***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.021)
Canada -0.008 -0.005 -0.014 -0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
NAICS 6 controls yes yes yes yes
N 105,400 71,500 29,100 19,500
Notes: Table reports the marginal effects that correspond to OLS estimates
for the probability of fragmentation and offshoring presented in the paper.
Standard errors clustered by state. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% sig-
nificance respectively. Probit sample is not identical to OLS sample because
certain industry fixed effects predict outcome perfectly, in which case the ob-
servations are dropped from the probit estimation. a Distance between plant
i and closest deep water port; plants within 50 miles is omitted category.
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